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Besides, it also provided a back-ground to pol- icy of Islamization subsequently pursued by General Zia-ul-Haq which was punctuated with statutory laws like Hudood Ordi- nance or blasphemy law during Nawaz Sharif era. The repercus- sions unfolded from the s onwards were the astronomical rise in sectarianism and militancy exemplifying in suicide bombing and target killing.

Other variable that helped centralization and transcendence of regional fault lines was the Urdu language. As stated earlier the bulk of Muslim League leadership came from the either UP or Bihar, which had been the breeding ground for the Muslim separatism in Colonial India, Urdu, with particular emphasis on its Persian script was deemed as extremely important symbol of Muslim and Pakistani identity.

Since the days when the Urdu- Hindi controversy had flared up in UP during the closing decade of the nineteenth century, Muslim Ashraaf used Urdu as a symbol to bring the ethnically and culturally divergent Mus- lim together. When Pakistan was founded as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state with Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Mohajirs, Balochis and above all Bengalis constituted around The fact of Bengali majority sent tremors among the ranks of West Pakistani ruling elite comprising Mus- lim League politicians, Bureaucrats and military officers.

That policy of deploying Urdu as an instrument for integration, however, boomeranged and evoked violent responses particularly in East Bengal and in Karachi , in which scores of people lost their lives. In order to counter the Bengali majority the provincial elections were nullified and then all the three provinces namely Punjab, Sindh and North West Frontier along with Balochistan and tribal areas were lumped together into One Unit called West Pakistan in Hence West Pakistan province was carved out.

Now two provinces namely East Pakistan and West Pakistan were given equal representation, thus denying Bengalis their majority in the parliament. NWFP ministry also met the same fate. Change however came but for worse. However before proceeding further, it seems appropriate that the rise of bureaucracy and the tightening of its stranglehold should be dwelled at.

In view of the enor- mous difficulties the state of Pakistan has to grapple with some institutional changes were made, enabling the bureaucracy to operate independently of the political leadership. The most sig- nificant of the all such changes was the subordination of the entire bureaucracy under newly created post of the Secretary General.

Hamza contends that the post of the Secretary General was created at the instance of Mr. Jinnah probably advised by the first incumbent of that post himself. Muhammad Ali was appointed as Secretary General, undoubtedly a very capable Punjabi officer with substantial experience in the finance department of Gov- ernment of India. As a Secretary General, Chaudhry Muham- mad Ali was accorded a direct access to all the federal secre- taries and all the files.

Hamza Alvi succinctly explains the functions of the planning committee in the follow- ing words: Through the mechanism of the planning committee, presided over by the Secretary General, the entire state apparatus was able to function as a unified machine under a single head. Given this mechanism, the Cabinet was bypassed and its proceedings were reduced to meaning- less ritual.

Important issues were decided in advance in the Planning committee and the ministers and the Cabi- net acted as mere rubber stamps, ratifying bureaucratic decision with, at best, some minor amendments. Deci- sions on some large issues were not even referred to the Cabinet on the principle that ignorance is bliss.

The Constituent Assembly debates in provided an ample testimony to bureaucratic indifference which has become an ethos on which the Pakistani civil servants were trained and raised in theses debates. Many provincial ministers complained about several officers who refused to carry out their orders because the ministers have no powers to hold those offices accountable.

In fact, Jin- nah himself did not allow potential rivals of any weight and standing to spring up. As a result political leadership of Pak- istan after him was spineless and devoid of any foresight which also had a negative fall out on the party organization of Muslim League. Hence, democracy in Pakistan rested on the shaky and shifting foundations. Wily and Shrewd Skindar Mirza belonged to the political service of India but he was trained at Sandhurst.

At Sandhusrt, during the course of their training both Ayub Khan and Sikander Mirza became friends and that bond lasted till the third week of when Sikander Mirza was deposed from the presidency of Pakistan and sent packing to UK by the former. Hence, without having a full fledge Minister, every thing pertaining to defence ministry was left to Sikander Mirza. However it did provoke a belated response from the politicians and the Assem- bly attempted to curb the powers of the Governor General in so that the powers to dismiss Prime Minister could be wrested away from him.

That move by the politicians proved to be a bit too ambitious. That was the period known for the political intrigues and conspiracies and exhilarated the process that led to the military rule in Sections of the Muslim League leadership did not approve of the appoint- ment on the ground that this ex-congress leader had opposed the creation of Pakistan.

The formation was followed by defections from members of the Muslim League, eager to cross over to a party which had the blessing of the Civil Service. Thus, a series of short lived government was formed. Political par- ties, deprived of real power in the legislature, were reduced to the status of bickering factions controlled by the executive.

It had less than 10 percent of the industrial base and a little over 7 of the employment facilities. Pakistan bequeathed It had a paltry rupee million as its opening cash bal- ances. It was in however that Pakistan government allocated for the first time the meager amount worth Rs. In the first decade after independence the economic policy had three main characteristics; a.

At the time of independence there was hardly any large scale industry in the areas constituting Pakistan. As a result of that practice the areas falling in India after retained the industrial base. On the eve of the Independence, out of top fifty seven Indian companies only one was owned by a Muslim. That group made a windfall profits from Kore- an War bonanza in the early s and invested the same money afterwards on industry. Akbar Zaidi writes: The industrialization process that took place in Pakistan in the mid and the late s was ably nursed through by the bureaucracy, which played perhaps the key role in establishing industrial units in the country.

Moreover, a trade policy that had a forma- tive influence on industry was also actively perused, so that a particular type of industrialization process could take root. One can contest him by saying that bureaucrats, by accumulating the economic resources fur- ther entrenched their control over the state apparatus.

Introduction 39 References 1 Subrata Kumar Mitra ed. Rajan, Real and imagined Women London, The movement in support of the Ben- gali language was suppressed by the state machinery on 21 Febru- ary In the course of that violence many people lost their lives. Introduction 41 Not only the event is commemorated each year by a Remembrance Day but it also proved to be a beginning of the end. Mitha, Linguistic Nationalism in Pakistan, unpublished M. For over a decade its leadership kept on groping for political stability how- ever bureaucracy and military coalesced to form an oligarchy and the political leaders of the country were consigned to the margins of the polity.

Ayub Khan. Resultant- ly the political edifice of the country was, as if resting on the shifting sands; no government in such circumstances could bide enough time to establish itself on the firm footing. Ibrahim Ismael Chundrigar lasted only for a few months in office. The case of Feroze Khan Noon was no different either. Despite political insta- bility and ever increasing control being exercised by the oli- garchy, the pressure continued to mount incrementally throughout and for holding the elections as provid- ed under the Constitution.

Awami League was expected to sweep the polls in East Pakistan. One thing was, however, certain. Sikander Mirza successfully torpe- doed the election plan of the politicians. That coup dismantled the apparatus of constitutional govern- ment which, given the prospects of general elections, could throw up a new political leadership that would not be pliable enough.

Such a prospect could put an end to the political manipulation of the Governor General and then, after , President Mirza. So, it was not a military coup, as Hamza con- tends, although Martial Law was proclaimed. He believed in absolute centralization of the state structure which implied all powers to be vested in his person. Thus he became the autocrat, with unbridled powers. Ayub Khan, Salon among the Subalterns, in the words of Ian Talbot, was quickly promot- ed in super session to few of the distinguished senior officers like Gen.

Akbar Khan. The reasons like administrative skills and presumed apolitical posture may also be attributed to his rapid rise to the position of power. He was given extension as C-in-C in His apolitical posture is a fact that can easily be contested because he had not only been privy to the political59 intrigue since the days of Ghulam Muhammad but he was also undoubtedly one of the architects of Pakistani political land- scape in s.

Then he was powerful enough to veto any policy which he thought colliding with the interests of armed forces. Whatever may be the case he emerged as the most powerful man in polit- ical sphere in the s, and s. The dominance of the military after independence was aided in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the developing world, by the support provided by the United States. In my own experience, this is conspicuously so in Pakistan…the American military assistance programme is increasingly aware of these possibilities and … had tended to bring military and economic elements in closer contact.

The self perception of the government was pro- vided by the ideological constructs of the modernization theo- ry. The military was projected as modernizers of traditional society. In common with most self images, it was a flattering view. That aspiration on the part of military found its realization in the Constitution that has been discussed below in some length.

To him that constitution was in complete disjunction with the genius of the Pakistani people. Therefore he felt a dire need of another con- stitution for the people and the country which had not yet been ripe for democracy as practiced in the West. Consequently, a new document was prepared and it was promulgated in The fundamental feature of that constitution was concentration of all powers in the hands of Ayub.

Hence that constitution warranted a Presidential system of government with extreme- ly powerful President and the federal government. The provinces lacked sufficient autonomy, making it virtually impossible for the Provincial Governments to function in an autonomous manner. That constitution provided one list of subjects, i. The enhanced powers vested in the President and circumscribed role for the legislatures compromised whatever autonomy was granted to the provinces.

As a former Chief Justice of Pakistan has remarked under Constitution, Pakistan practically ceased to be a federation, as the Centre personified by the President enjoyed overwhelming authority over the provinces in important spheres. Justice M. It was the sole prerogative of the President to appoint Provincial Governors as his agent, whose prime duty was to keep him informed about the political developments in the provinces.

That Assembly was not more than a rubber stamp. Routine decision making too was delegated to bureaucra- cy, while Army maintained a low profile and opted not to meddle in the affairs of civil administration. Hence there was hardly any deviation from the state structure whose founda- tions were laid by the British. Like Viceroy in the Colonial era, Ayub Khan counted root and branch on the steel framework of civil services. The Constitution did not war- rant any space to the political parties.

Article gave sanction to any step taken in the national interest. Omar Noman is spot on when he says: The regime made confusion with the establishment of institution without the process of political institutional- ization. Latter implies legitimacy for the formal struc- tures of public authority. Their establishment without consent may be counter-productive. Instead of neutral- izing political tensions, these institutions become a symbol of mass alienation.

Under such circumstances, their significance lies not in the ability to incorporate specific groups but in their capacity to exclude critical sections of the population. Only those sections of the society were incor- porated which were patronized by the govt.

His structure had inbuilt capacity to exclude opposition. Such exclusion forced political communities to adopt violent means to regis- ter protest. The cardinal feature of the political policy formulation was the exclusion of the politicians from the political centre stage. About 7, individuals were relegated to ignominy through EBDO in Concurrently the Public Safety Ordinances already on the statute book to control news items was re-enforced in letter and spirit. The Progressive Papers Limited was taken over because of its alleged leftist leanings.

On 28 March , publication of any news related to strike and industrial unrest was banned. In the same year, every newspaper was forced to publish press notes issued by the central and Provincial Governments. In order to curb the dissenting voices A National Press Trust was conjured into existence, which was financed by 24 industrialists and patronized by the state.

The avowed purpose of its establishment was to foster and promote favourable senti- ments for the Ayub regime. They were not allowed to publish their work, which had dissenting substance in it. Government did not brook any criticism. Such members of literati or intelligentsia were posted out to the remote places; Safdar Mir was one such example. None of the academics or the member of the faculty with the overt leftist leanings could be employed in the univer- sities.

If there were public manifestation of dissent on the part of the academia, they were meted out with the punitive action. Qudrat Ullah Shahab was particularly instrumental in putting it together with the likes of Jamil-ud-Din Aali. Josh Malih Abadi and Habib Jalib were one of the dissenting voices in that regard. No hard thinking, however, had gone into the formulation of these policies.

He firmly believed in controlling all forms of political, social and cultural expressions. Even the judiciary was not spared. Law reforms that were instituted had virtual- ly subjected the courts under the super-ordination of execu- tive. At the district level judiciary and executive instead of separating were converged in the office of Deputy Commissioner. Regarding the higher rung of judiciary, controlling mechanism from the state functionaries had become a norm. Judges were inter- viewed by Provincial Governors and the President to ascertain their loyalty towards the government.

During the decade of fifties, Bengalis negotiated with other stake- holders in the power politics and aspired to have a share in the Central Government. Constitution of , despite several pitfalls did provide a framework in which the disparate groups and fac- tions could be accommodated to a certain extant. However that constitution did not afford an ideal arrangement.

Therefore Ben- galis were frustrated as Military-Bureaucracy oligarchy ruled the roost leaving a little space in the matrix of power for Bengalis but they were not desperate, still looking for the light at the end of the tunnel. In , elections were planned to be held, and they had a hope to have a democratic dispensation in which they would be the partners.

Military- bureaucracy oli- garchy was further strengthened at Bengalis expense. They were also under-represented in the services. Exasperated over the draconian rule of an autocrat, in , the mainstream political parties of East Pakistan presented a notion that in Pakistan there had existed two nations. That was indeed a clarion call, for the ruling oligarchy and also for the Pres- ident but it responded with non-chalance.

What ensued was a national conference in February , held in Lahore, where all the opposition parties convened a conference to discuss their dif- ferences and common interests. More noticeable issue however was the under-representa- tion of politicians from the East Wing. They were led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League, who presented his controversial six-points, which encap- sulated their political and economic program for East Pakistan.

The six points consisted of the following demands that a the government be federal and parliamentary in nature, b its mem- bers would be elected by universal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the basis of distribution of population; c that the federal government would have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense only; d that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts; e that taxation ought to be levied at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants; that each federal Unit is authorized to control its own earnings of foreign exchange; and f each Unit is permitted to raise its own militia or paramilitary forces; on average 4, riots were reported in East Pakistan till The country, therefore, was divided into 80, geographical units with each constituency comprising an average of electorate.

They, according to her, were primarily responsible for selecting the candidates. In that exercise of selecting the representatives of the people, the rural elite got strengthened even further. This arrangement in nomination virtually tipped the balance in favor of the rural politician. The role of industrial labour and intelligentsia, consid- ered to be most volatile sections of the urban societies, was disen- franchised.

Thus Ayub Khan legitimized his position as the President of Pakistan by securing Economic Development or Differential Economic Patronage Economic development, to Ayub Khan, was the panacea to all the problems that Pakistan had been plagued with. Therefore he launched a comprehensive scheme of economic development which commended by many.

Democracy manages to preclude the emergence of monopoly groups; hence wealth does not concen- trate into a few hands. Democracy therefore ensures relatively judicious distribution of the fruit of the development as its impact permeates down to the middle and lower middle echelons of the society.

Thus Ayesha Jalal makes sense when she points towards the politico-economic contradiction that emanated out of the sys- tem of basic democracies, she opines somewhat categorically: The exigencies hence adopted to make the BD system acceptable to whole of society in order to retrieve legiti- macy for the regime was essentially pregnant with politi- co-economic contradiction. To quell any form of resist- ance from the disenchanted strata of the society the economic progress was considered as the viable solutions.

But the BD system was concomitant with differential eco- nomic patronage to the narrowly defined political con- stituency. The assumption that rapid economic growth would trickle down to rest of the society, did not prove to the mark. As a result of the second five year Plan the large scale manufacturing sector grew at the rate of Investors were pro- vided considerable cushion of fiscal incentives.

Trade unions were proscribed and anybody inciting or effecting labour strikes could be charged and sentenced up to two years of imprisonment. A process of dismantling of direct controls on foreign exchange and investment sanctioning was initiated. A considerable increase in the rate of capital inflow into Pakistan was made possible. Hence increase from 2. The market for man- ufactured goods was made available by expanding the domestic demand instead of resorting to the policy of import substitution as it was the case in the fifties.

However, after during third five year Plan period things started going awry. In the wake of war with India, all foreign aid to Pakistan was suspended, although it was resumed a year later but its volume was consid- erably reduced than that envisaged in the third Plan. The situa- tion could not be improved as large amount of foreign exchange was apportioned for expending on the defense purposes after the war.

Such exigencies put a check on the industrial growth, a rise in prices and the re-imposition of controls because of the foreign exchange constraint. The emphasis on the manufacture of capital goods, as outlined in the Third five year Plan had to be aban- doned and greater focus was riveted on export oriented consumer goods industries.

The economic policies pursued by the government, which culminated into the rapid growth rate, gave rise to the tremen- dous political and economic tension. Urban areas were the hub of the mass protest movement spearheaded by the students, the industrial labour class and the lawyers.

These demonstrations were triggered off by substantial increase in the prices of the consumer goods, and fed on the immense resentment against the increasing inequalities through- out Pakistan. Izzat Majeed quotes a social scientist in order to demonstrate the wider impact of the two five year Plans. This type of lopsided industrialization fed on cheap labour provided by the impoverished masses, while social inequalities were maintained and deepened.

The Bengalis termed it the consequence of ethnic composition of military and bureaucratic elite. In fact it was not a coincidence that the benefi- ciaries were either Muhajirs or Punjabis. National integration had to be constructed on the basis of policies and institutions. Growth Rates Per capita income 3. The Land Reforms Regulation was brought into force on 7 February which had been indeed a serious attempt at land reform in West Pakistan, which was dominated by the landlords.

The high ceiling was acres of irrigated land or acres of un-irrigated land. However, intra-family transfers along with numerous other irregularities severely restricted the amount of land which was resumed. Big land holdings continued to exist and their owners kept on ruddering the destiny of this hapless country.

Instead of reminding people of the achievements of the Ayub Khan regime, the festivities high- lighted the frustrations of the urban poor afflicted by inflation and the costs of the war. For the masses, Ayub Khan had become the symbol of inequality.

Bhutto capitalized on this and challenged Ayub Khan. In East Pakistan, dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than opposition to Ayub Khan. By it was obvious that except for the military and the civil service, Ayub Khan had lost most of his support. The constitu- tion was abrogated, Ayub Khan announced his resigna- tion, and Yahya Khan assumed the presidency. Yahya Khan soon promised elections on the basis of adult fran- chise to the National Assembly, which would draw up a new constitution.

He also entered into discussions with leaders of political parties. Not only he is jeered and con- demned for some of his personal oddities but also for the alleged role, he played in the separation of East Pakistan. All nuances and subtleties of the historical process are convenient- ly overlooked.

The role of Yahya Khan in effecting such an omi- nous change from Pakistani standpoint cannot be vindicated however it is also not justifiable to put all the blame of such event onto him as myriad currents and cross-currents wove the complex cobweb of historical course culminating into the dis- memberment of Pakistan. That pre- carious situation was compounded because the pendulum of divisive tendency had already swung and reached the extreme end. Yahya did not have the political acumen and insight nor the energy and the will to redeem a country that was stuck in the quagmire of knotty tangles.

All said and done, Yahya regime was not a departure from the past rather it was a contin- uation. It was a much chastened military leadership, although it was clear that Yahya Khan represented a continuation of Ayub Khan, who personally had to go because he had come to symbolize a hated regime. Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan was born in Chakwal on 4th February to a Shia Qizilbash family of Persian decent who could trace its mil- itary links to the time of Nadir Shah.

His father Saadat Ali Khan hailed from Peshawar. Yahya did his graduation from the Pun- jab University with flying colours. During the 2nd World War , he took part in military action against the axis power in North Africa, Iraq and Italy. In the course of a military campaign he was once captured by axis forces but successfully escaped from the prisoner camp in Italy in his third attempt. His role in setting up the Pakistan Staff College at Quetta is indeed commendable.

He commanded an infantry division during September war against India. In the wake of wide spread turmoil and agitation, Ayub Khan ran out of all options but to relinquish power for Gen. Yahya Khan to take-over. He, immediately after coming to power declared Martial Law in the country on March 25, and assumed the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator.

Only six days later, he, though reluctantly assumed the office of Pres- ident as well. On March 29, , through an Ordinance the interim Con- stitution in the form of the Legal Framework Order was draft- ed. It in fact provided a modus operandi for the holding of the forthcoming elections. Yahya Khan made a commitment to return to the civilian rule under a re-drafted constitution.

He also agreed that representation in the Assembly should be determined by population distribution, ensuring that East Pak- istan would have more seats than West Pakistan. On 7th December , the first elections since the creation of Pakistan were held for which Yahya deserves a due credit. However these elections could not restore political normalcy in the country.

Instead political turmoil was com- pounded because the elections threw up a split mandate. Thereby, neither Bhutto nor Mujib was ready to accept his adversary as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, which vitiated the political climate of the country. Both of them remained obdurate over the convening of the session of the National Assembly thus the impasse continued. Now it was up to Yahya to take a decisive action but he messed up the situa- tion even further.

Political agitation became a recurrent feature in East Pakistan. The coercive policies of Pakistani state and Indian intrusion aggravated the situation. This resulted in war between India and Pakistan in that culminated into the dismemberment of Pakistan. Yahya had to resign and put in a house arrest by his successor Z. He breathed his last on 10th August, in Rawalpindi. Problems inherited from Ayub Anarchy and chaos reigned supreme when Gen.

Therefore people heaved a sigh of relief when Martial law was enforced. Quite conversely when Gen. Yahya seized power, the political leaders had salvaged their lost reputation to a substantial extent and also regained the mass support.

Only one infantry division aided by a squadron of Korean War, vintage US-built F Sabre jets was what had been available for East Pakistan to feel content with, against vastly superior adversary. Thus the demand for an independent defense capability started finding resonance among the Bengalis.

Quite contrary to what is being propagated in the Pakistani textbooks and media, the Opera- tion Gibraltor failed to achieve the desired target, of liberating Kashmir. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the most prominent among them. According to Talbot, however, the Agartala contacts did not provide solid evidence, suggest- ing Mujib at the behest of India hatched secessionist conspiracy in East Pakistan.

Therefore the trial against the accused proved to be extremely counter-productive particularly in such a volatile political atmosphere. Mujibur Rahman was already behind the bars since May causing indignation among the Bengali bourgeoisie. How- ever when the reports of police torture were revealed to the public, Mujib and his co-defendants took on the status of mar- tyrs. In East Pakistan the powder keg was virtually ignited when one of the defendants, Sergeant Zahurul Haq was tor- tured to death while in custody.

In order to placate the dissenting ele- ments from East Pakistan, Ayub withdrew the case and decid- ed to convene a round table conference. Mujibur Rahman went to participate in the round table conference but on the question of provincial autonomy he staged a walk out. Hence Round table conference failed to achieve what it was convened for. Consequently the situation kept on deteriorating, thus provid- ing no light for the Ayub regime at the end of the tunnel.

Change of the Horse Man seemed quite imminent. The situation was not very conducive in West Pakistan either. The sentiments against One Unit scheme had been smol- dering for long. Ruling elite comprising Punjabis and Muhajirs did not pay any heed to the demands of those asking for decen- tralization. West Pakistan was Zone A. Similarly East Pakistan had been declared as Zone B.

Those zones were sub- divided into sectors and sub-sectors whose administration was assigned to military officers. The four officers constituting the Council acted as eminence grise for Yahya. Despite that Cabinet the four Generals remained through out in a priv- ileged position.

They were the key decision makers. Two of the other four were former politicians who held Cabinet posts before Ayub Khan took over in The seventh was a retired Major-General and a graduate of the R. The eighth minister was a former Chief Jus- tice of Pakistan. Except the two former politicians, the rest of them held important official posts in the past. Ghulam Umar as its Secre- tary.

The span of its activity, however, remained very limited. As the situation in East Pakistan became turbulant leading to a civil war, National Security Council became dormant. Auto- cratic attitude and the policy of extreme centralization had started giving rise to the sense of alienation particularly in East Pakistan. Other than the microscopic minority in the ruling civil-military oligarchy, large segment of the society was ren- dered utterly disenfranchised.

Needless to emphasise however, situation had not been any dif- ferent even before Sensing the urgency, Yahya Khan undertook the policy of appeasement in order to placate the alienated sections, Bengalis in particular. Therefore in his broadcast to the nation on 28 July , Yahya expressed his firm intention to redress Bengali grievances, the first major step in this direction being, the doubling of Bengali quota in the defence services.

At that time East Pakistanis had just seven infantry battalions. However, he wasted away lot of time in unnecessary ventures some of which caused confusion and social conflict. During Ayub days, labour was divested of the right to strike and trade unions were also banned. In order to redress that grievance of labour Air Marshal Noor Khan announced a new labour policy whereby the right of collective bargaining was restored, and in case of the failure of bilateral negotiations the right to strike and lock out was also restored.

The newly drawn up labour policy further simplified the method of recognition of trade union, provide regulations for their proper functioning reduce admin- istrators powers of prosecuting the union in the court of law in cases of default and extended legal protection to the office bear- ers of the union. Welfare fund with rupees one hundred million as seed money was instituted.

The main objective of that policy was to appease labor; however, one must not be led to believe that government had withdrawn its control over the labor. Unfortunately the proposals of planning commis- sion could not be materialized owing to lack of funds. It was supposed to supplement the capital resources of small and medium sized enterprises in the private sector in East Pakistan and also in the under developed region of West Pakistan.

The head office of the Industrial Devel- opment Bank was also shifted to Dhaka. It was demanded that these shortfalls should be rectified prior to the introduction of new Plan. Such contentions and arguments were set aside by the military leadership and Plan was introduced.

It was however, disrupted because of the insur- gency and the military actions in East Pakistan. In order to put a curb on growing nepotism, favoritism and corruption in the civil administration and to rehabilitate its neu- trality many Martial Law regulations were enforced.

Yahya also tried to cut higher civil services down to its size. Under the Martial Law regulation no. Although they were provided opportunity to defend them- selves but barring handful few rest of them were either dis- missed or compulsorily retired from service. The state structure was liberalized by relying on professionals in order to reduce the influence to bureaucrats in the policy making process. All that notwithstanding, there remains no doubt that under the Yahya regime the real power rested at the centre which was the secretariat or CMLA headquarter.

Gen Pirzada was calling shots. This time we will do every thing and take the credit too. These states until that time were being ruled by their princes despite their accession to Pakistan. Immediately after assuming power, Yahya Khan made a promise of holding free and fair elections. These features are given as under; 1. Pakistan would be a federal republic, known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ensuring its independence, territorial integrity and national solidarity; 2.

Islamic ideology would be preserved; 3. The Constitution could be valid only if authenticated by the Presi- dent. Therefore, tt was contrary to the principles of democracy. Total members for the National Assembly were to be The National Assembly seats allocated for East Pakistan were Tribal areas had 7 seats for National Assembly.

Islamic ideology and Muslim head of the state. They also tried to popularise two nation theory to counter the politics of left, particularly in the s which was termed as un-Islamic. LFO was in fact a strategy of appeasement toward political parties. In East Pakistan, the Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman won almost all the seats but two out of , ironically however it could not secure even a single seat in West Pak- istan.

It bagged 81 seats but from East Pakistan it could not get any seat. The Awami League secured The situation also spawned agitation, especially in East Pakistan when it became apparent that Sheikh Mujib was being denied his legitimate claim to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Political impasse ensued with no amicable settlement in sight. Yahya assumed the role of arbiter. Hawkish figures in the Army did not believe Mujib. We might be better off with a smaller but more manageable and more com- pact Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Yahya Khan and his coterie of advisors were adamant to bring Mujib down for a compromise. Hence, Yahya Khan postponed the Nation- al Assembly session scheduled on 1st March, saying the biggest political party from West Pakistan was not taking part in the inaugral session.

He also claimed the postponement of the session would give more time to the political leaders to work out a political settlement. Subsequently, he announced 25th March, as a new day for the Assembly session. The postponement gave rise to a serious political turbulence in East Pakistan.

From March onwards Awami League unleashed a reign of terror on the non-conformists and particularly on the members of Urdu speaking community. Awami League leaders took over the reins of power in their own hands. The writ of the state had virtually collapsed. Hence the Operation Searchlight was kicked off on 25th March The Operation Searchlight was a long drawn and bloody engagement between Bengalis and the Army. Militant wings of Awami League were very active and their ranks swelled when a large number of personnel from the East Pakistan Rifles, East Pakistan Regiment and the Bengali Police deserted, some of them ran away with the arms.

In addition to that the East Pakistani public had turned against Pakistan Army. Such a situation proved very conducive to the guerillas of Mukti Bahini who retreated to the rural areas and offered refuge by the Bengali people whenever Army launched an operation.

Suffice it to say however, the douement of that bloody struggle was the separation of East Pakistan. Con- clusively speaking it was the policy of centralization of the Cen- tral Government that led to such a horrific finale. Both relied on the support of a predominant- ly Punjabi Army and civil bureaucracy and, through the exten- sion of differential patronage, on social and economic groups with political bases that were neither very extensive nor wholly independent as to pose a serious threat to the stability of the regimes… the collapse of the two regimes is a resounding com- ment on the limitation of state consolidation under military and bureaucratic auspices as well as the resilience of political opposi- tion whether organized or semi organized in societies subjected to systematic de-politicization.

The Services Chief resists any ministry defence tempting with their personal recommendations including promotion, transfer and postings. New Highways. Fifty Years of Pakistan Oxford, , p. III, p. Quoted in Talbot, Pakistan, p. The Muslims of the Sub-Continent had started voicing their concerns with increasing authority and confidence.

Subsequently, he obtained a law degree from the University of Oxford in England. Thereafter, he was offered a teaching position in the faculty of Law at the University of Southampton. He lectured there for some time but preferred to come back.

He taught constitutional law at the Karachi Universi- ty but only briefly. He also practiced as a barrister at the Sindh High Court in Karachi from to Bhutto was a landlord and could have expected to protect the interests of his class. He was a Sindhi, and was to be looked upon to stand up for Sindh. Contrarywise, education in the Western elite institutions inculcated in him the deep understanding of such ideologies like socialism, democracy, equality and rights of the downtrodden.

Leading economists and social scientists were por- traying the state as benign, while landlords and capitalists were all portrayed as either motivated by self interest or selfishness only or by the outright desire to be evil. Consequently the state was the only tool that could be entrusted with the responsibilities of production and distribution of rewards.

In January , he was entrusted the more important and high profile Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The successful negotiations of an oil exploration agreement with the USSR in , and development of ties with Socialist China were indicative of the direction that he wanted Pakistan to take. In a realm of foreign policy he tried his best to wean Pakistan away from West.

Among the multiple facets of his personality, the organizational ability fig- ured quite prominently in him. Ayub, in recognition to that abili- ty of Bhutto, appointed him as the Secretary General of Conven- tion Muslim League after the Presidential elections.

However, Tashkent Declaration in sowed the seed of discord between Ayub and Bhutto. Bhutto organized the second Islamic Summit in at Lahore. Simla Agreement Signed. Pakistan got back square miles of territory occupied in war. National Book Foundation was established on 24th Sep- tember, 4. Establishment of Quaid-e-Azam University on 9th Febru- ary, Establishment of Port Qasim Authority on 27th June, Identity Cards for Citizens on 28th July, He laid foundation stone of Pakistan Steel Mill on 30th December, Bhutto proposed a Third World summit on September, Banned alcohol, gambling and other un-Islamic activities, also declared Friday as weekly holiday instead of Sunday.

Bhutto was a spell binding orator. He had the knack of casting a spell on those among the audience, in his generally very large public rallies. Besides his oratory that enthralled and inspired many, Zulfi Bhutto was also a prolific writer. Numerous books and pamphlets vouch for his immense potential as a pen push- er with popular appeal. Military action in East Pakistan ended in a disaster as the separatist movement brewing up in East Pakistan fructified in the forma- tion of Bangla Desh in December Thus the civilian rule could at last be established but at a price of the dismemberment of Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army was thoroughly discredited and the morale of the masses was at its lowest ebb when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over the reins of the government in December A whole new stratum of political leaders emerged to take up responsibilities under the PPP rule from to This transition was, however, not limited to the age factor alone. A far more significant change had taken place in the form of shift from the status quo orientation of the previous rulers of Pakistan to a commitment to economic and administrative change.

In that sense, the second generation leadership man- aged to recreate some of the dynamism of the independence movement in terms of mass mobilization. A Pakistan envisioned by the Quad-e- Azam…. That Pakistan will come, it is bound to come.

This is my faith…but…I need your co-operation. I am not magician…with- out your co-operation I simply cannot succeed. To institutionalize the supremacy of the democratic forces was indeed a daunting task because the interests of the military-bureaucracy oligarchy were so entrenched that rein- ing in, seemed indeed difficult yet imperative for the democra- cy to flourish. Resistance from Army Even after the crisis of East Pakistan, the Army was still reluc- tant in relinquishing power for the popular government to take- over.

Friction with the military also arose, in , over refusal of a general to supply troops to quell striking policemen engaged in a pay dis- pute in Punjab. The removal of Lt. The Constitution outlines the framework of federal, democratic structure. Any attempt to sub- vert the constitution could invoke the charge of a high treason enshrined in the Article Hence, not only the powers were dispersed but also the tenure of the Chief of the Staff was cut down to three years.

He was also quite apprehensive about the eruption of any movement against PPP regime. He loathed dissent like any other autocrat of the third world countries. In order to put curb on any political mobilization against his regime, he pro- pounded a scheme of constituting a security force so that the involvement of the Army in ensuing law and order could be pre- cluded. They violently defy established authority … the situation deteriotes so much that it becomes necessary to call upon the armed forces to intervene.

Once the armed forces inter- vene they play the game according to their own rules. It is nec- essary for a civilian government to avoid seeking the assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities and prob- lems… generally the police and other law enforcing agencies failed to control a really serious agitation. We must make provi- sions for a first class force.

FSF was accorded legislative sanction through an act of Parliament in June One indication of Army top brass displeasure was its blatant refusal to impart necessary training to FSF. It also blocked the acquisition of tanks and other equipments. In fact it became an instrument to intimidate the parliamentary opposition and gagging the dis- senting voices. In , a few members of the National Assembly were thrown out of the premises by FSF and Prime Minister had to acknowledge that they are a group of degenerated thugs.

In order to do that he not only increased defense budget but also exempted military officers from land reforms. The size of the armed forces also went up quite consid- erably. Bhutto employed anti-Indian rhetoric with profusion that gave way to jingoism thus the skewed image of the Army was somewhat salvaged.

His resolve to fight for one thousand years or enunciation to eat grass but make atomic bomb is a clear illustration to his militaristic mode of thinking. Omer Noman states about the organization of this service, and the changes that were made so as to give it a new orientation: Recruitment procedures and the restrictions on selection to this service were similar to those employed by the colonial government.

In practice this ensured the selec- tion to the top echelons of the Civil Service remained under the control of the few entrenched families. Approximately bureaucrats of the CSP cadre had stood at the helm of an administrative machinery of over , members. The annual intake to the elite crops was restricted to around twenty individuals.

The entire bureaucratic machinery was amalgamated into a hierarchal, but mobile, framework of twenty-two pay scales. Separate provision for entry into elite crops was terminated. Bhutto initiated a scheme of lateral entry, administered by Establishment Division instead of the Federal Service Commission to bring in technocrats and specialists with an intention to enhance the efficiency of the government func- tionaries. The policy of nationalization made it virtually imperative for Bhutto to bank on bureaucrats who could provide an administrative oversight to a large num- ber of institutions.

The investment in the large scale private sector during the same peri- od rose from Public sector could not generate capital neither production proved to be burden on tax payers. All the demands and expostulations for the provincial autonomy proved to be nothing but the cry in the wilderness. In this regard Bhutto failed to be an exception. The legacy therefore continued whereby the whole state structure used to revolve around a single person.

The policy of national- ization too was a mean to the same end. The first phase of the nationalization was carried out by the influence cast by the ide- ology of the left. It began in January resulting in the nationalization of 31 industrial units.

Consequently the credit polices were restructured that affected top 22 families which had emerged on the economic horizon of Pakistan in s. No compensation to land owners, land redistributed without charge to landless tenants cultivating resumed land. Share system remains unchanged. Land revenue, water rates, and seed costs born by land lords and cost of fertilizers and pesticides to be shared equally. Tenants eviction decided by revenue courts if tenants failed to pay rent, failed to cultivate land, sublet tenancy, or rendered land unfit for cultivation.

The salient features of land reforms act are mentioned below. Compensation to land owners on resumed land at Rs. Land lords contin- ued to be the most important determinant of the politics in Pak- istan. It made promises of redistributing resources but those promises could not be translated into reality. While commenting on the failure of reforms S. All lands in excess of acres allocated to Government. Economic policies during the Bhutto regime were the clear resonance of centralized control by Islamabad, yielding mixed results.

Such a policy formulation was not expected of a leader who was democratically elected and representative of the popu- lar voice. Banks were nationalized and the creation of the dis- bursement of credit was controlled. Credit was used to cre- ate new social classes and strengthen the ruling elite. Incentive was given to the middle class farmers and peasants.

Penetration of banks disrupted the traditional agrarian structure and aggravated the tenant-landlord un-easy rela- tionship. Agriculture got disrupted because of labour export to the Middle East. Only when Lampson left Egypt in , after twelve years of service, did King Farouq start to feel truly a king.

Despite their hatred of the British presence in their country, ordinary Egyptians were obliged to swallow British in- terference in Egyptian affairs when it was the only alternative to suppressing the autocratic leanings of the Palace and restoring constitutional rule, as happened in , and again in During the Second World War, the British had an even bigger say in Egypt's economic and political affairs.

In the course of their retreat before Rommel's attack, they even considered flood- ing the Nile Delta to halt his progress if necessary,5 Egypt's contribution to the Allied war effort was enormous. On 14 June Captain J. May reported the reaction of the Egyptian crowd watching the parade of British troops celebrating their King's birthday:.

Why should we allow them to do this? The Egyptian monarch tor the first few years of constitutional government was King Fouad. He had been brought up in a despotic environment and was a great admirer of machiavel- lianism. He resented the Constitution of , and indeed be- lieved that without British insistence there would have been no constitution. While it was being drawn up, he confided to one of his aides that 'if this constitution was meant to be Bolshevik he would claim Lenin's powers, and if it was meant to be demo- cratic he would claim the powers of the American president'.

Independent Egypt's Political System 5 two-fifths of the Senate. Fouad did not hesitate to use his powers to the full and encouraged his supporters to establish royalist political parties: in al-Ittihad the Union was founded, and then in al-Shaab the People. He frequently attempted to reduce parlia- ment to a consultative body and cabinets in his reign never fell through a vote of no confidence or served out a term of office; they were dismissed at royal will. Parliaments never lasted for their full term of four years but were invariably dissolved by decree.

The average life of a cabinet was eighteen months and during the ten-year period from to parliament sat for a total of only thirty-two months. In addition, King Fouad was known to have a weak character10 and was notoriously corrupt. The political pattern established under Fouad persisted in the new regime. The powerful chief of the Royal Cabinet, Ahmad Hasanain Pasha, confided to a journalist friend: Tell your Wafdist friends that if His Majesty had to depose the government or dissolve the parliament once, he will indulge in it for good I advise them to be gentle and mild with him.

They should understand his feeling as a young man who might be sneered at by his princely relatives if he showed weakness before the Wafd If he follows the course of his father he will never stop, for he is young, obstinate and proud of his people's love for him. According to a minister of the period, Farouq was 'a victim of mental unsoundness, unstable family life, the breeding of a father who in effect hated the Egyptians, lack of education, bad advisers, and accession to the throne at a young age.

The Treaty of settled the issue of Anglo-Egyptian rela- tions for a while, and the internal power struggle between the Palace and the Wafd intensified. The young King bolstered his popular image by presenting himself as a devout and energetic. He managed to rally the support of the al-Azhar shaikhs, powerful independent politicians like AH Maher Pasha and emerging extra-parliamentary groups such as Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the early part of the Second World War he showed pro-Axis leanings, to the fury of the British: in February British tanks surrounded the Royal Palace and Farouq was forced to order the formation of a Wafd government, a gesture that enhanced his popularity as a symbol of national resistance.

Farouq did everything in his power to consolidate his own position and undermine that of the Wafd. Ali Maher transformed the Palace-Wafd struggle from the language of memoranda and articles into the language of demonstrations and street clashes between supporters of the two camps. Farouq's fifteen-year reign witnessed no fewer than twenty-four cabinets. He strengthened his grip on al-Azhar and found among its ulama those ready to offer theological sanctions for his actions.

He interfered directly in elections, making it possible for his sup- porters to raise electioneering slogans such as: 'Elect the candi- date of the Palace' and 'Do not elect so-and-so. He infiltrated government offices through agents who leaked detailed information to him. At his. He was consulted in every- thing.

His permission was required for everything, by all governments. Nothing could be done without his approval. Not just the major affairs which he was entitled to know, but also the minor ones like appointing a municipal director, giving fifteen days leave to the Egyptian consul in Liverpool to see his ill mother, changing the winter uniform of army and police men into the summer uniform.

Since the time of King Fouad, between and , the agenda of the cabinet was checked first by the King to recommend the items which he wanted and defer the ones he did not want. This happened in all reigns whether of the majority or of the minority governments. Parliament never attained sufficient weight to control or even to challenge the monarch, and the executive administration remained a facade behind which virtually dictatorial powers were exercised.

As al-Tabi put it, 'A supreme order neatly written on a piece of paper and signed by the Master of the country was sufficient to paralyse the constitution and dismiss the government which people elected, for no reason but a royal whim.

It is hardly surprising that the monarchy should in the end have lost the support of its own ultimate guarantee, the army, and become the principal target for the young officers who seized power in July Even the British began to view with concern the excesses of the monarch.

As Lord Killeam reported: Prince Mohamed Aly called on me in Alexandria this morning and said he wished to speak seriously on a very grave matter. The vagaries of King Farouk were becoming alto- gether too much; and in the interest of the country one of two things should be done: 1 either he should go, or 2 the laws of the country should be so tightened up as to exercise a real check upon the Royal vagaries. Egypt was ruled by a crazy youth who must be restrained I told His Royal Highness that he must know that this teasing situation was continuously in our minds.

But clearly we did not wish to provoke any more internal crises in Egypt: nonetheless I would confess, in strictest confidence, that I often wondered more and more how we could carry on with this irresponsible youth. At the same time we were not in the habit of crossing our bridges until we came to them. And I could not foretell in advance how we should react in the event of a major constitu- tional clash.

But my own present feeling was that, admirable though it was in theory to keep out of Egyptian internal politics and leave the King and his Prime Minister to fight it out together, yet the more I pondered upon it the less easy did it seem in practice for us to do so. If, for example, Nahas Pasha went to King Farouk and insisted as on the face of it he had every right to insist, as a Constitutional Prime Minister upon His Majesty comporting himself both with greater correc- titude towards the elected Government of his country and also with decorum more befitting a Monarch and incidentally the Head of the Moslem faith in Egypt.

I9 The Wafd the Delegation was established in the heat of the Revolution of to represent the Egyptian nation in its bid for independence from British rule. It was not initially a political party in the conventional sense of the word,20 Its leader, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, said, 'Those who say that we are a party aiming at independence imply that there is another party among the people which does not aim at independence.

This vision, however, was not born with the Wafd but took shape gradually in the course of its struggle. By 'neither in act nor statement was the Wafd liberal nationalist, but in fact mostly as a result of a pursuit of a prag- matic policy of political agitation it had indigenised the im- ported ideology of liberal nationalism'.

In the first parliament of , where the Wafd had a. Independent Egypt's Political System 9 majority of seats out of well over 90 per cent , Zaghlul used his majority to bar the journalists of the opposition Consti- tutional Liberal party al-Ahrar from attending the inauguration of parliament and shortly afterwards stripped its leader of his parliamentary seat.

Between and , however, the Wafd became more willing to co-exist with other parties. The transformation of the Wafd into a parliamentary political party was facilitated by a number of practical steps. First, it contested the elections of on the basis of the Constitution of , formulated by a committee in which the Wafd was not represented and which Zaghlul denounced as a 'committee of gangsters'.

His assumption of office, rather than leaving this to one of his lieutenants, sobered his attitudes, transforming him from nationalist leader into party president. Third, Zaghlul's first cabinet included a number of ministers who were neither Wafdist nor militant nationalists.

Finally, the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in the same year brought the humiliating downfall of Zaghlul's government under British pressure, and provided a further impetus to the Wafd's trans- formation into a fully parliamentary political party. As a political party, the Wafd became the guardian of the constitution—the constitution of the 'committee of gangsters' became the Constitution of the Nation. Apart from amending the Election Act, to widen its franchise, the Wafd majority in parliaments of the period did not amend the constitution itself but defended it as it stood.

The scant respect shown by the Palace for constitutional life further encouraged the adherence of the Wafd to the constitution. Moreover, the constitutional question occupied the Wafd's attention beyond its former concern with Anglo-Egyptian rela- tions.

Depriving the Wafd of power seemed an effective means of forcing it to compromise with Britain and divert its attention to its own internal opposition. A speech by its secretary-general Makram Ubaid Pasha during the Palace- Sidqi regime , which abolished the Constitution of and introduced a more royalist one, indicates the Wafd's new appeal:. By a parliamentary vote. In Egypt today parliament is a tool of the Government and contains no representatives of the people because the Opposition took no part in the elections.

What other course is open to the nation to effect the desired change of Government? But with the British troops in Egypt revolt is impossible, for, on the pretext of protecting foreign lives and interests, these troops would be rushed to assist the Government at the first sign of trouble. The defenders of the Constitution could hardly count on a popular insurrec- tion to bring them back to power. Thus a greater element of unscrupulousness entered Egyptian politics, so that any means justified the need to seize and retain power.

In its short spells of office, a total of six years, two months and twenty-nine days over three decades of parliamentary democracy, the Wafd did not always respect its principles and corruption, embezzlement, and favouritism were prevalent under its rule. When its opponents started to adopt semi-Fascist techniques of political agitation the Green Shirts of Young Egypt, the Palace-sponsored street clashes with supporters of the Wafd, and so on , the Wafd retaliated by establishing its own paramilitary Blue Shirts As one political party among others, the Ward's goal was simply to replace its rivals as the majority party and its success, accord- ingly, held little promise of radical change.

There were several reasons for this decline. The signature of. Independent Egypt's Political System 11 the Treaty of lessened the intensity of the national issue, in which the Wafd had been protagonist, and brought to the fore- front, the country's internal problems.

The Wafd's popularity, accordingly, came to depend more on its ability to rule the country effectively and to handle its social problems success- fully. Although the Wafd's record in this respect was more tan- gible than that of its opponents, it remained generally one of failure in view of the grave social problems faced by most Egyptians. The resurgence of the nationalist movement, however, allowed the Wafd to retain its leading position and secure alle- giance of the vast majority of the population.

On the other hand, the party's championing of constitutional rule secured for it a measure of popularity, since most Egyptians enjoyed greater political freedom under a Wafd government. The Palace's attacks against it were even more crucial in this respect: The Palace's resolve to keep the Party out of office proved to be a blessing in disguise for the latter. The parliamentary parry remained the only organized link between the leadership and its mass following. According to Salah Issa, 'the Wafd was a broad banner hovering over a crowd which it had no interest in organizing'.

The uneven course of solving the national problem, together with the diverse social interests and the aggravation of Egypt's social and economic problems, had an impact on the hetero- geneous Wafd. It suffered, but survived, a number of splits. As early as a group of its leading figures seceded from it while negotiating with Britain to establish their own Constitu- tional Liberal party al-Ahrar , thus setting the scene for a multi- party system in Egypt.

They succeeded in reaching agreement with Britain and formulated the Constitution of Although this group had formed the core of the original delegation which became the nucleus of the Wafd, the vast majority of Egyptians followed the Wafd of Zaghlul Pasha, since the Constitutional Liberals were seen as defenders of landed interests who had been alarmed by the extensive sabotage committed in the jac- querie of Another secession occurred in and led to the formation of the Saadist party, led by popular ex-Wafdist leaders of urban business-class background.

It came at a time when the Wafd's status as representative of national unity was fading after the signature of the Treaty of But by allying themselves to the Palace and by their repressive measures after taking office, the Saadists themselves repaired the damage which they had in- flicted on the Wafd's popularity.

For the same reason, the secession of the Wafdist Bloc in , led by the Wafd's secretary-general Makram Ubaid Pasha,35 proved an abortive threat. These dissensions in the higher ranks of the Wafd were less important than those which affected its main following. They took two forms. The first was the alienation of an increasing proportion of both actual and potential supporters of the Wafd in the ranks of the politically most active sector of the population, the urban middle class and the intelligentsia, which had now begun to find new platforms for political expression.

The second was a sharpening of divisions within the ranks of the Wafd itself. Independent Egypt's Political System 13 Towards the end of the Second World War the party activists had begun to polarize into right and left groupings, each of which maintained distinct views on nationalist issues, relations with the Palace, and social and economic policy. Post-war repression forced the two camps to stand together. The right36 continued to dominate the party's leadership, confining promi- nent leftist figures like Dr Muhammad Mandour and Dr Aziz Fahmi to a subordinate level.

When the Wafd took office in the polarization was virtually complete on both party and cabinet levels. There were at least three groups within the cabinet and they did not hesitate to publicize their wranglings over policy and personality issues. By the Wafd had become such a heterogeneous organization that it bore little resemblance to the policy and outlook of the party which formed its first government in Its internal divisions persisted until the army takeover of power in July , when the party proved quite unable to resist its dissolution by the new regime.

The Palace was the stumbling block in the Wafd's attempts to establish a steady constitutional life in Egyptian politics. From the very beginning the Wafd believed in the sovereignty of the nation and aimed at a constitutional monarchy, which clashed with the autocratic tendencies of King Fouad.

Without reaching a pact with the monarch or taking part in the formulation of the constitution, the Wafd envisaged a constitutional pattern which would better the prospects of a constitutional monarchy.

The cabinet insisted that this should all be carried out through the govern- ment. After legal arbitration and Zaghlul's threatened resigna- tion, Fouad was forced to give way but he soon restored his position after the downfall of the government in the same year. Under the leadership of Nahhas Pasha, the Wafd tried to pilot through parliament bills designed to prevent the violation of the constitution by the King. The Wafd government, however, never finalized such bills.

In practice, the Wafd leadership chose to compromise with the King. While continuing to fight for the curtailment of his powers, it declared its loyalty to the throne37 and 'never envisaged the feasibility of forming a Republic of Egypt as it took monarchy for granted'. They made no effort to protect themselves against recruitment to positions within the Palace during the Regency Counsel period.

Makram Ubaid con- fided to the leading Palace official Ahmad Hasanain that the party 'had buried the past with the death of King Fouad, that it anticipated more favourable opportunities under Farouq and that the Wafd government had rejected a proposal to raise the age of accession to the throne from eighteen to twenty-five years'. The young and energetic King enjoyed a measure of popularity in the early part of his reign.

He succeeded in undermining the Ward's position in that Nahhas Pasha was unable in the s to chal- lenge the power of the King as Zaghlul had done in the s. Both the King's constitutional powers and his autocratic ten- dencies remained unchanged save for periods when the British chose to check his powers and exercise their own. The Wafd government imposed by the British in failed to seize the opportunity to undermine the powers of the King and indeed adopted a less hostile attitude towards him.

In this period also the Palace instigated the secession of Makram Ubaid from the Wafd. It returned to power in January , with the ambition of at last arresting the decline of the entire political system after years of repressive rule, economic crises and political assassinations, and in the face of the intensification of the nationalist struggle after the army's defeat in Palestine. By this time the King's reputation stood so low that he was compelled to compromise with the Wafd to save his tottering throne.

Instead of taking the opportunity to rid itself of Farouq once and for all, the Wafd adopted a policy of reconciliation with the Palace. The party's justification for this attitude was its intention of abrogating the Treaty of and its consequent desire to neutralize any possible opposition from the King.

In practice, the outcome was simply to perpetuate the King's control over the Wafd and to leave him free to indulge himself as before. The Wafd's conciliatory attitude towards the King did not result in a comparable change in the latter's attitude towards the Wafd.

Responsibility for the choice of this policy lay with the Wafd's. Independent Egypt's Political System 15 secretary-general, Fouad Sirag al-Din Pasha, who believed that while popular support was sufficient to bring the party to power, it could not for long sustain it in power in the face of royal opposition. Sirag al-Din was widely criticized for turning a blind eye to the King's excesses. These laws were introduced by a Wafd deputy who was in fact forced to withdraw them in the face of public outrage.

The precarious balance between the three main forces of the political system was bound to collapse sooner or later. Condi- tions during the Second World War made Egyptians realize that their country was no nearer to independence than at the time of its Revolution in Few Egyptians had any real sympathy with either side in a war in which, as they put it, they 'had no camel'.

If they were compelled to take sides, they would choose the Germans in the hope of disrupting the British control which rendered their country's independence a mere travesty. As one politician put it, 'The people of Egypt are Germans. British power in Egypt was all too clearly demonstrated in the incident of February Although this incident was prompted by the war conditions and resulted in installing a government which enjoyed the popular support of the Wafd, it became clear.

The emergence of extra-parliamentary political groups led to the intensification of the political struggle. A wave of political assassinations claimed the lives of two prime ministers; and two cabinets were forced to resign because of their inability to ensure public security. Even the staunchest defenders of the political order began to lose confidence in its merits. The last Wafd government was summoned to act the role of saviour, to control the increasingly uncontrollable public unrest, and in the hope that it would keep the people quiet rather than lead them.

Under this government both public unrest and royal misconduct intensified. The Wafd was caught in the middle, totally unable to take clear measures to tackle the problem. Con- fiscating newspapers and magazines did nothing to reduce the level of press agitation and the attempt to legislate tighter control of the press ended in failure.

Even existing laws were less strictly enforced and citizens accused of insulting the 'Royal Entity' the King were usually acquitted. Under public pressure the Wafd government abrogated the Treaty of In doing so, it declared the exhaustion of its traditional methods of national struggle and legitimized the use of force against the British which amounted to a negation of the system itself.

Guerrilla attacks on British troops in the Suez Canal Zone soon followed. Independent Egypt's Political System 17 The government began to lose control of its ultimate weapons, the police and the army. There was growing unrest among the police since the army had been used to suppress their strike fora wage increase in During the struggle in the Canal Zone they found themselves national heroes in the Zone itself, with flowers thrown at them for fighting the British, while in Cairo they acted to repress the demonstrators who instead hurled stones at them.

On 26 January , however, they gained a measure of sympathy when they took the side of the demon- strators a few hours before the Burning of Cairo. The previous night a squad of their colleagues had been besieged in their station by British troops in the Canal Zone and a number of them had been killed. Some of the younger officers took part in the armed struggle in the Canal Zone. A small and secret nucleus known as the Free Officers began to extend its influence and succeeded in distributing leaflets throughout the country.

Their first open act of defiance was to reject the Palace candidate for the presidency of their club and elect their own choice. In the face of his loosening grip on both the police and the army, the minister of the interior and defence proposed the formation of an intermediate force modelled on the Italian carabinieri,50 but it was too late.

In a memorandum to the King during the last Wafd govern- ment the Opposition leaders wrote: Your Majesty, people can not bear it for long. We fear a holocaust that will not only destroy those responsible for the country's troubles but will also subject the whole nation to moral, financial and political bankruptcy. Destructive doc- trines will spread as a reaction to the prevalent epidemic of the abuse of power.

The development in size and influence of the politically active middle class offered a breeding ground for these new forces. The political role played by the middle class dates back to the time of the Revolution of , which opened the way for the establishment of a liberal parlia- mentary system in Egypt. At that time, the urban intellectual and professional wing of the middle class, the effendis, together with its rural wing, the village notables, played an active part in the Revolution and formed its local leadership in various urban districts and rural provinces.

In his first People's Government in Zaghlul was prudent enough to include in his cabinet two effendis, Wasef Ghali and Naguib al-Gharaballi, for the first time in the history of Egyptian cabinets. Over the three decades of the constitutional regime the local leadership of the Wafd party was drawn mainly from this social stratum, although it was not proportionately represented in its highest command.

The Wafd was able to claim the allegiance of most sections of the urban and rural middle class—the effendis, the professionals, the petty bourgeois shopkeepers and merchants, the less wealthy rural notables and the Egyptian section of the nascent industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. One of the early attempts to under- mine the effendis' allegiance to the Wafd was in , when the government of Muhammad Mahmoud Pasha introduced regula- tions prohibiting government employees from taking part in political activities.

Despite its narrow economic power base, being largely a self- employed or an employed class rather than an employing class, the political influence of the middle class in a country like Egypt reflected the fact that, although numerically small, it was never- theless the largest articulate and literate grouping in the society.

In addition, the civil servants, a major component of the middle class, were close to the seat of power in both central and local government. The expansion of Egyptian industry during the Second World War enhanced the development of the urban middle class by. Independent Egypt's Political System 19 enlarging the local bourgeoisie and increasing the numbers of white-collar workers see Tables 1. Table 1. Occupation No. Note: a. Includes actors, doctors, chemists and pharmacists, school administrators, professors, teachers, authors and editors, lawyers, engineers.

The number of theologians, usually classified among profes- sionals, increased merely from 53, in to 52, in a 2. The massive increase in the number of writers and journalists was also of great political importance, Since the s a variety of reasons had led increasing numbers of middle class to express their discontent with the political system: the moral bankruptcy of a regime supposedly 'democratic' but in fact extremely 'dictatorial', as best indicated by the repressive regime of Sidqi Pasha ; the regime's evident failure in the face of the economic crisis of the s, with its severe impact upon the middle class and consequent.

II, p. Arnold Smith, a British scholar teaching in Egypt at the time, noted: During the past two years, in which I have been lecturing to 3rd and 4th year students at the Egyptian University, I have become convinced that there is a widespread and growing awareness among educated youth here of the almost hopeless backwardness of the present social and economic set-up in Egypt.

Students, young professional men, young army. Independent Egypt's Political System 21 officers, etc. There was increasing middle-class activism, and extra-parliamentary organizations which had in the s represented merely a vocal challenge to the regime began in the s to pose a serious threat to it. The very fact that they are, by reason of their scholarship, breaking away from practices of their ancestors, must neces- sarily encourage a feeling of restlessness which is no doubt intensified by their growing realization of the social in- equalities of the society in which they live and in which the remuneration for the posts and careers open to them is, in most cases, still very poor.

It is not surprising that in such circumstances the great bulk of the Effendis should have a strong feeling of social grievance. The question of the growing importance of the Effendis and their probable future role in the Middle East would seem indeed to deserve careful examination. It was also these groupings which supplied the student movement with its active core. None of the new forces which emerged to challenge the ailing liberal system had the strength to transform the political order on its own; but their joint impact, despite their divisions, served to undermine its credibility and accelerate its eventual collapse.

In the final years of the liberal regime, its challengers began to identify the consi-. No such front was in fact formed and no clearly worked - out organizational formula for its establishment was ever seriously discussed. Such limited efforts at co-ordination as were undertaken in no way justify the estimates of its success offered by Anwar Abdel-Malek and other writers. Even the period of the Canal Zone guerrilla struggle did not lead to the establishment of a national front.

But it was not only ideological differences that hampered the creation of such a front. In the absence of an organized mass movement or vigo- rous trade unions, the new political groupings were under little pressure from below and showed little active inclination to attempt to seize power.

One crucial inhibiting factor was the continuing presence of the Wafd party as the major force in the political system. Not only did the extra-parliamentary groupings fail to agree on a homo- geneous policy towards the Wafd; but the very fact that the Wafd retained to its last languid minutes the allegiance, though no longer the enthusiasm, of the majority of the population pre- cluded their thinking in terms of an immediate inheritance of the Wafd's position.

The prestige of the Wafd declined more slowly than that of the other components of the regime, the Palace and the minority parties, partly because it was the mino- rity governments and not the Wafd itself which undertook the task of suppressing the new political groupings. The Wafd was thus left to assume power through parliamentary elections in and no attempt was made to exploit the temporary dissi- dence of 26 January , the day of the Burning of Cairo, to seize power.

Only through their links with the armed forces the Free Officers did the new groupings have any real chance of over- throwing the regime. As bearers of the rank of 'officer', these. Independent Egypt's Political System 23 men were the product of Egypt's second step towards indepen- dence.

After the signature of the Treaty of , admission to the Military Academy was broadened to allow the entry of sons of the middle class. The incident of February , in particular, had injured their national and professional pride and alienated them from the Wafd. Their defeat in Palestine and the scandal over defective arms had alienated them from the Palace. Their poli- tical awareness had been deepened by the agitation of the new political groupings, with which in some cases they enjoyed direct organizational ties.

While they shared the broad political and social ideas of these groupings, they were unique in their organizational capacity to act as a single unit despite the political differences57 within their ranks. Consequently, while they may well have been sincere in wanting to seize power on behalf of the new groupings, it is not surprising that they should ultimately have chosen to retain it for themselves.

The newly emerging industrial bourgeoisie struggled to introduce educational changes which were a prerequisite for fulfilling its very different needs for accoun- tants, engineers, technicians and managers. But its attitude towards the education of the urban working class that it required merely the provision of basic literacy had much in common with the attitude of the landowners towards the rural population.

The majority governments of the Wafd, however, were more responsive to public pressure for better oppor- tunities, and they achieved some advances in their terms of office over the three decades of liberal government. Apparatus An indication of educational development during the period is provided by the state budget, the main source of finance for education. From the data given in Table 2. The number of students as a proportion of the total population also increased over the same period while the number of university students rose steadily, more than doubling in the five years between and Although the numbers of girls enrolled in higher education increased, they remained massively under-represented in higher education throughout this period Table 2.

Source: Waardenburg, Universites, vol. Table 2. Note: n. Figures for these two years are different from those totalled in Table 2. The rough numerical parity between the two branches of higher education, however, was not reflected within the general secon- dary schools, where greater emphasis was laid on the study of theoretical subjects. The syllabus of the last year of the general secondary school, from which students pass to the university, showed a clear concentration on theoretical subjects.

As Table 2. Educational and Social Conditions 27 Table 2. Although the number of elementary schools increased greatly between and , they were of such poor quality and so over-crowded that the impressive statistics of rising enrolment were widely regarded as almost meaningless. About 80 per cent of all school children attended the elemen- tary schools, which employed some 57 per cent of the country's teachers at this level. In the primary schools, by contrast, the remaining 43 per cent of teachers taught only 20 per cent of the.

Thus the elementary school teacher had an average of forty-two pupils in a class, as compared with the primary school teacher who had fourteen. Moreover, the better-educated teachers were largely concentrated in the urban primary sector. Even after the two types of primary education were merged in , the former elementary schools remained poorly equipped, especially for the study of foreign languages; in practice, the way to higher education remained blocked for their students.

In secondary education, academic schools continued to draw the great majority of the students. Following a law of which made secondary education free for all, a flood of primary school leavers jammed the academic secondary schools in the course of The secondary technical and trade schools, on the other hand, which had expanded to some extent during the s, experienced a drop in enrolment.

The technical schools were poorly administered, inefficient and inadequately equipped and the quality of the teaching staff was also poor. Most graduates sought not a position in industry but a clerkship in the bureau- cracy. The number of its pupils, however, increased relatively slowly since the turn of the century. As shown in Table 2. Intellectual Trends Until the basic feature of the educational system was the dual system of primary education.

Primary schools led to an academic secondary school and thence to the university or to a white-collar job in the bureaucracy. Elementary schools, by con- trast, were the sole and very poorly equipped schools designed to absorb the vast majority of the children of school age in the rural areas.

Liberal intellectuals took a critical view of this duality in primary education: It has been considered undemocratic to have two systems of education, a superior and comprehensive program for those who can afford to pay a small proportion of the expenses of their education, and an inferior and dead-end program for those who cannot. Al-Azhar remained an independent educational authority in its own right and it was only in the mids that its traditional lower education institutions, the kuttabs, which had survived for centuries, were transformed into schools.

In his controversial book The Future of Culture in Egypt, pub- lished in , Dr Taha Hussein pioneered liberal criticism of this situation in an outspoken manner. He suggested that al- Azhar: should not be allowed to remain a state within a state, a privileged body capable of defying public authority with im- punity. State supervision of Al-Azhar's primary and secon- dary school is vital at this stage of Egyptian history since the traditions and religious obligations of the venerable institu- tion have made it a focus of conservatism and antiquated practices.

According to Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'The division of our school system is unparalleled in the world and imposes danger on our people's unity. Educational and Social Conditions 31 be doctors, engineers, theologians or teachers. The place for specialization and vocational preparation is the higher insti- tutes of learning. The new age needs a more diversified professional leadership—engineers, scientists, agriculturists, doctors, social scientists and humanists as well as theologians.

The curriculum of schools would reflect these needs of the nation There was a permanent surplus of school-leavers and graduates of certain branches of secondary and higher education. The business sector provided a very narrow labour market for educated manpower.

Advocates of educational reforms attributed this problem partly to the popular prestige attached to government occupations. As Radwan noted, 'There is something unhealthy about a situation in which the youth of Egypt seek the security of government posts even when salaries are low and work is of a routine clerical type. As Radwan complained, The nation suffers a very serious occupational maladjustment, and the most promis- ing jobs and the most needed are these in the field of industry.

In his book The Policy of Tomorrow, published in , Mirrit Boutros Ghali wrote: We must warn, and persist in warning, that the economic development of the country does not allow the absorption of these young men. It is necessary that the responsible people should acknowledge this bitter truth and then combine their efforts to see to it that advanced and specialised instruction is spread with measure and calculation, proportionately to our economic development.

Admission to every school or college should be limited, and higher examinations made more strict, so that the cultural level of the educated be raised and the number of yearly graduates kept down. The resultant savings could be used to create more job opportunities for the unemployed, who would gladly work for modest salaries I know of none of the Western democracies that dealt with unemployment by contracting education or restricting it to one class of people to the exclusion of all others.

What they did was to make their education an education for life, to prepare the student to face the world armed with the knowledge he acquired in the school. Educational and Social Conditions 33 The system of examinations, though less strict than that which Lord Cromer had imposed on Egypt, was criticized for perpetua- ting the antiquated teaching methods in use.

As Taha Hussein put it: Everyone waits for the end of the year and the paper that will arrive from the school or the Ministry announcing the results. Consequently, school boys are driven to the virtual exclusion of everything else. As long as examinations are a goal, passing them will be the goal of goals.

He explains the material piecemeal, and the pupils try to commit it to memory after him. Knowledge has become deficient and vague, hardly exceeding mere definitions, clas- sifications, technical terms, dates of events or examples given in books. The student has thus been transformed into an intelligent parrot. It concerned itself with minor details at the expense of drawing up a clear educational policy. The need to reform women's education was recognized as particularly urgent.

The movement for the emancipation of women had developed in parallel with the broader nationalist movement since the active role which women had played in the Revolution of Gradually they won increasing support from large sections of the intelligentsia. Girls were admitted to the. Liberal advocacy of educational reform met resistance not only from the traditionalists and Islamic fundamentalists but also from within liberal ranks—a populist section advocated the 'democracy of education' by universalizing public education and minimizing restrictions on admission to higher education, and a conservative section stressed the 'quality' of education in purely pedagogical terms.

The contrast between these two cur- rents of thought was typified by the controversy between Taha Hussein and Ismail al-Qabbani over the question of teacher training. While the former was willing to allow university graduates to become school teachers, the latter advocated that only those who had received pedagogical training in special institutes should be permitted to become teachers.

Socio-Economic Conditions Despite the lack of statistics about the social origins of university students in Egypt from the s to the s, many researchers agree that the bulk of these students came from lower middle- class families in the urban areas, especially the effendis, and middle landowning families of the rural areas. Some, indeed, lived perilously near to starvation in order to complete their studies.

Craig, a British scholar who lived in Egypt for some time, reported a telling example: In a shack built on the roof of our house there lived, through- out the winter, part of a provincial family which had come to Cairo so that the two sons may be educated. All of them lived on beans and bread and various scraps, financed by the distant father, a peasant work- ing in his fields. Educational and Social Conditions 35 In Egypt, despite the praiseworthy efforts that are being made in the field of education, a lad must still go to school when he can, and after may not get the opportunity until he is fully grown and can leave his village for Cairo.

Levels of student fees,27 together with the high cost of living in urban areas, sharply restricted student numbers, con- fining higher educational opportunities to families with suffi- cient resources and placing impossible barriers in the way of the sons or daughters of the poorer rural families. Al-Azhar, how- ever, with its theological schools and university, provided these poorer families with an alternative opportunity since it offered free tuition, board and lodging for the period of study.

Its students included a large number drawn from relatively poor rural families. Egyptian students were acutely sensitive to ques- tions of economic opportunity. For many of them, education was their only passport to a better future and they were deeply concerned with the likely effect of economic conditions upon their future prospects.

In there was a series of strikes by school and university students over employment and other related issues. On 10 November students of the Faculty of Commerce went on strike for one day and published an article in al-Misri newspaper en- titled 'Graduates of the Faculty of Commerce and their Future'. They see that a large number of students who have completed their studies at the university remain without employment, while those who were lucky enough to enter the Government Service have, in accordance with the Ministry of Finance circular of the 8th October, ,.

The same circular lays down that holders of the Egyptian baccalaureate certificate i. A few years ago, i. The fact that this is no longer possible is attributed to some fault of the Government's and the existing feeling of discon- tent is therefore directed against the Government.

In order to ease the situation as far as possible, the Ministers of Finance and Education have done their best to open new venues of employment. They have approached directors of banks and other large financial and commercial establishments recom- mending that graduates of Government schools and of the Egyptian University should be employed by them, but this appeal has so far met with little success, chiefly owing to the fact that the qualifications required by such establishments, e. The government was compelled to tighten up the immigration regulations, and no foreigners were permitted to enter the country to take up employment until proof had been given that no suitable Egyptian candidate could be found.

In the post-war years further strikes were reported. In , for instance, students of the industrial schools went on hunger strike for permission to pursue higher technical studies and become engineers. University tutors and school teachers joined in the agitation, demanding better salaries and job conditions. The problem of graduate unemployment was one of the major themes throughout the controversy over educational reform.

British officials in Egypt, too, showed an acute interest in the problem. As one of them put it, The real "effendi" problem is. Educational and Social Conditions 37 that of the poorly paid government officials, the commercial clerks, and the "out of work" graduates'. In a memo- randum on the state of education and student unemployment in Egypt written at the request of the British Embassy, a British university teacher, Arnold Smith, noted: During the past two years, in which I have been lecturing to the 3rd and 4th year students at the Egyptian University, I have become convinced that there is a widespread and grow- ing awareness among educated youth here of the almost hopeless backwardness of the present social and economic set-up in Egypt.

Students, young professional men, young army officers, etc. That this situation can become politically dangerous is of course obvious. In this light Smith challenged the Embassy's hostile attitude towards the establishment of the new University of Assiut: Restricting higher education is a very superficial remedy to the problem of graduate unemployment. The only real solu- tion would be energetic measures of social reform. This would employ graduates of technical schools and would also neces- sitate a large number of inspectors, administrators, etc.

As Kerrput it: It is this explosive compound of the high aspirations and self-conscious dignity instilled by university education and the unpromising conditions of the job market that has made university students and graduates a continuing revolutionary force throughout the past half-century in Egypt. The student body turns into a proletarian dictatorship. Nor can it adequately be explained by purely domestic problems such as 'serious trouble in the family budget',36 as suggested by French com- mentators, or for that matter by students' lack of sports activities as one British commentator believed.

The spread of liberal education gave students a numerical strength while the country's low level of economic development frustrated their ambitions for future careers. The rocky course of the country's constitutional life led increasing numbers of them to doubt the adequacy of its political system.

The regime's inability to achieve the complete indepen- dence for which the nation had revolted in was the concrete proof of its overall failure. The collapse of Ismail Sidqi Pasha's government , which had replaced the Constitution of by a less 'populist' version in , prepared the way for a renewed wave of political agitation aimed at restoring the original constitution.

The government of Tawfiq Nassim Pasha was seen by many shades of Egyptian political opinion as an ad hoc govern- ment suited to fulfil this task. It acquired the support, or rather the passive co-operation, of the Wafd against a background of British consent. For one thing, Nassim was well disposed towards the British. More importantly, Britain was eager to clear up the disorder in Egypt in order to concentrate on the looming threat of Fascism nearer home.

Nassim's government began by abolishing the Constitution of but it did not supplement this measure with the restoration of the Constitution. In- stead Nassim, backed by the British, preferred to formulate a new constitution combining elements of its two predecessors. On 9 November Sir Samuel Hoare announced in London's Guildhall that although Britain acknowledged that the Constitution of had proved 'unpopular', it viewed the Con- stitution of as 'unworkable'. As a result, Nassim's govern- ment, in view of its dependence on British support, was forced into a critical position in the face of public opposition to the.

In this predicament it lost the support of the Wafd and was denounced by its leaders as 'a clerical office annexed to the Residency'. The students began to organize and called at the headquarters of several political parties to discuss the matter. On 13 November Zaghlul gave a public speech in which he called for non-co-operation with the British and demanded once again that the government resign.

Encouraged by the Wafd declaration, the students took to the streets of Cairo. Bashatli Effendi of the Ministry of the Interior reported that: on the 13th November about undergraduates marched from the University of Giza to Cairo in a most threatening manner.

The students displayed a very determined, bitter, and aggressive spirit. They were much more difficult to deal with than in the past. On 14 November a university students' demonstration in the capital, with an estimated four thousand participants, clashed with the police force, led by some British constables, at Abbas Bridge which connects the University with central Cairo.

An agricultural student, Muhammad Abd al- Mageed Morsi, was shot and killed by the police. A second demonstrator, an arts student named Abd al-Hakam al-Garrahi,4 was seriously injured and died in hospital a few days later. His funeral turned into a national demonstration: Whenever a demonstrator dies, the great problem for the authorities is to get the funeral over with the least possible disturbance. In all cases but one the police succeeded in avoiding serious trouble. The deceased was related to an officer of the Royal Guard.

Medical students at first concealed the body in the hospital and refused to divulge its whereabouts until an assu- rance had been given that a public funeral would be per- mitted. The funeral, which took place the same evening, was. Student Political Activism 41 very largely attended. The deceased was treated like a national hero and political leaders such as Nahas, Sidki, Mohamed Mahmoud and others, accompanied the procession part of the way.

To curb their spread, Nassim's government prohibited the newspapers from publishing the news of student demonstrations and called on the army to sup- press them. It also closed the university on several occasions fora week at a time, and then was forced to close it indefinitely on 8 December. The previous day, several thousand students held a ceremony in the university grounds where they erected a monu- ment which they smuggled into the premises in memory of their martyrs. The rector of the university, together with other professors, attended the ceremony and addressed the students.

Afterwards a large number of students marched towards the capital. The Egyptian historian Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi saw the student uprising of as an episode of great importance: The student demonstrations of November and December were sound in form and pure in purpose.

Title

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Roi on brand investments But before handing over the power to the public representatives, he decided to secure his position as the head of the state. Objective Haseeb shaikh encap investments was an evident testimony haseeb shaikh encap investments their influence on the government and karl dittmann forex super scalper ea functionaries of the state. In addition, the civil servants, a major component of the middle class, were close to the seat of power in both central and local government. Thus far the democratic experience predicating on Islamic ideology has led to the cultur- al and social fissure in the society that is essentially plural, the fact that would be explicated down below. Constitution ofdespite several pitfalls did provide a framework in which the disparate groups and fac- tions could be accommodated to a certain extant. The killing of the soldiers led the British to send an official protest to the Egyptian government.
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FOREX TAVITIAN ALEXANDRE

Historical facts however fail to corroborate such a view point. Vesting of the executive powers in the Governor General proved anomalous to say the least. In such a circum- stance the Prime Minister became a superfluous entity. Similar- ly, Muhammad Ali Jinnah reposed greater trust in the bureau- crats instead of his political comrades which invigorated apolitical elements in Pakistan.

Consequently neither the free and fair elections could be held nor could constitution be framed and promulgated. Constitution making and elections would have scuttled the unbridled powers of bureaucracy, represented by Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Ch. Muhammad Ali and Sikan- der Mirza. That trio along with Gen.

Ayub Khan ruled the roost in s. Having said all that, one must not loose sight of the fact that oligarchic rule that Pakistan witnessed comprised military and West Pak- istani feudal politician, bureaucrat being most powerful. In the s bureaucrats were preponderant with Army acting in a subsidiary role.

How- ever, during Ayub era army assumed greater importance. The Army-bureaucracy nexus sustained nevertheless. Conversely politicians were given a rough shod. In thousands they were EBDOed. Introduction of basic democracies and Constitu- tion were the means to perpetuate the personal rule of Ayub Khan.

When he had to contest elections against Fatima Jinnah in , he managed and manipulated them with the help of state machinery. Besides, muzzling of the press and particularly sup- pression of the leftist political forces had an adverse fall out in the long run. Ayub Khan was indeed provided a prototype for the subsequent Army autocrats to emulate.

The autocrats whether civilians or otherwise need pliable judiciary. Therefore the doctrine of necessity remained an anath- ema precluding Pakistani judiciary to be independent and pro- people. From the days of Justice Munir to Justice Irshad Ali Khan, Pakistani courts have been validating the arbitrary acts of Army Generals usurping power at the detriment of constitution- al rule.

Justice Rustum Kyani, Justice Cornelius and Iftikhar Chaudhry are the exceptions who had the gumption to stand firm in the face of such indiscretion. Ironically majority of Judges found no qualms of conscious in taking oath under the Provisional Constitutional Orders. Ambivalence about the role of religion in the public and political life has caused conceptual and ideological confusion among the masses.

That amalgam of moder- nity democracy as a Western construct and tradition articulat- ed in Islam steeped in its primordial context has provided a rationale to the cleric of Lal Masjid and Maulana Fazl Ullah in Swat to challenge the writ of the state in the name of religion. Continuous mention of Pakistan founded in the name of Islam has given clerics a free hand to propagate the medieval ideas and notions in the name of Islam. Refer- ring to history one might say such tendencies flourished slowly but steadily over a period of time.

The first stride towards that direction was taken immediately after the birth of Pakistan. Objective Resolution provided a firm foundation for such a dispensation whereby religious fundamentalism could prolifer- ate. The preponderant misnomer in the public discourse among the liberal section of Pakistani public that Deobandi Ulema had been in opposition to the creation of Pakistan needs to be revis- ited.

Deobandi opinion regarding the creation of Pakistan was in fact divided. These Maulanas and the religious outfits remained the main stream voices of considerable reckoning throughout the history of Pakistan. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Isla- mi are the two exponents of the politics of strong religious ori- entation. However they found a centre stage in the s at Gen. Afghan Jihad enhanced their role in the political and public life as they had been financed by Saudi funding.

Later on the spate of sectarianism and suicide bombing was the culmination of those Islamists who could hardly with- stand the religious difference. In this circumstance democracy can not strike roots and exactly this happened in Pakistan. Pakistani civil society is rudderless to say the least. As a consequence fissiparous tendencies particularly in smaller provinces gained strength thereby posing a continuous threat to the federal structure of the state.

Another factor for the civil soci- ety to flourish is the social and cultural plurality. Governance, in simple terms, is the process by which deci- sions are made and implemented. Political theorists study gov- ernance at international, national and local levels. In the recent years good governance is regarded as a yard stick of the devel- opment particularly in the third world economies.

The tangle however is that good governance is considered by some as an independent criterion of democracy. Hence the decision making in the realm of economy becomes, specifically in the case of Pak- istan, the sole preserve of apolitical actor, mostly the economic wizards, having no stakes whatsoever in Pakistani polity. This monograph seeks to explore the dynamics of governance at national level by highlighting roles of political as well as apolit- ical actors involved in the formulation and implementation of decisions.

Theoretical fea- tures of good governance: like participation of all stakeholders, transparent and census-oriented decision making, accountabili- ty, rule of law; in order to minimize corruption and incorporate the marginalized groups- can hardly be observed in the frac- tured political fiber of the country. Problems of governance can only be understood by studying the genealogy of democracy in the country, which was mostly ruled by the under-representa- tive or undemocratic structures.

With the over-developed state structure the prescribed aims and objectives of good governance could not be ensured which are accountability, transparency, minimal role of the state in the economic activity, rule of law. As democracy does not have a smooth sailing in Pak- istan therefore good governance remains as an unrealized dream. Burgeoning defense expenditure and virtual immunity of the Army from any measure of accountability and its contin- ual interference in the affairs of the state is an impediment of substantial magnitude in the realization of good governance.

Moreover the monopoly of the state over the decision making process is yet another factor hobbling the onward movement towards achieving the desired goal. Democracy can be the only panacea for all these ailments, plaguing the polity and economy of the beleaguered state of Pakistan. In the lines to follow, all these facets would be subjected to analytical inquiry.

All the major events in the political and con- stitutional history of Pakistan would be analyzed meticulously. Contemporaneous spate of fundamentalism and the danger that it poses to democracy and good governance would also be addressed and apprized. Impediments in the Evolution of Democracy Pakistan, as a post colonial state, has a chequered history with a few interludes of democratic rule during the sixty years of its existence.

Parliamentary democracy collapsed four times prima- rily due to mismanagement, disproportionate development of institutional matrix and the mounting political ambitions of the Army Generals. Therefore, colo- nial legacy and its overall impact in the post independence era would be the first query to be unravelled in the lines to follow. Another moot issue is the nexus of Islam with the state of Pakistan and the zestful projection of it.

Conceived as an ideological state with sup- posedly Islamic character gave rise to political ambivalence but also provided an ample space to the clerics in the political arena of Pakistan. That ambivalence is compounded further when par- liamentary democracy is also fore-grounded as a prerequisite for the sustenance of Pakistani state.

Hence the parliamentary democracy would function within the iron girdles of ideological framework. Islam was tipped, by some quarters, as a distinct code of life, with its peculiar system of government denouncing democracy as an alien system. Mercifully however, such view could not muster the popular support. Thus far the democratic experience predicating on Islamic ideology has led to the cultur- al and social fissure in the society that is essentially plural, the fact that would be explicated down below.

In that scholarly endeavour, the underpinning rationale punctuat- ing the separatist thematic they centred the argument on three variables acting as the wedge namely Islam, Urdu and the diver- gence of the Hindu welt. Hence Islam as an identity marker was accorded extra ordinary salience in the struggle for Pakistan by the League leadership and thereby Islam became a rallying cry for the Muslims of various hues vis a vis the com- posite nationalism of Indian National Congress.

As a corollary the notion of Two Nation Theory, embedded in religious exclu- sivism attained complete legitimacy. That ideological orienta- tion was deployed as a ruse by the apolitical elements in Pak- istan to hobble the institution of democratic dispensation in the country.

That indeed is a paradox whereby the modern nation state is equated with the ideology that seemed to be mutually exclusive. That sort of a mis-match has not only stunted the development of the demo- cratic institutions but also impeded the smooth functioning of the state apparatus that needs to be addressed in this narrative.

The estab- lishment asserted its role to ensure strong power centre at the detriment to the provincial and regional actors, who were con- signed to the margins of Pakistani polity. It has led to the problems of inte- gration particularly East Pakistan. These problems did not end here. Sindh and Balochistan too have not reconciled to the cen- trist approach.

Such political and administrative arrangement ought to be brought under the scholarly spotlight. Some political analysts argue that the democratisation of the state and the society did not initiate together.

The political cul- ture that triggers peculiar change in the society enabling it as a consequence to take control over the state remained under- developed. Conversely the state had been exercising its control over the society and the representatives of the society could not act as the supervisory body over the arbitrary functioning of the state, a point that would need further unpacking.

Before taking up these questions one by one, it seems perti- nent to furnish a few basic facts about Pakistan to put it in per- spective. With , square miles of area, Pakistan is located in the west of India and to the east of the Persian Gulf. Its spatial proximity to Russia and China makes it strategically very important among the comity of nations. Instead Islam in Pakistan has various sectarian and mystic shades.

Sectarianism, for last quarter of a century, has become a great social bane, which had not only a local but also international dynamics. Biraderi or kinship group holds a lot of importance as a social institution and locus of political authority in central Pun- jab and to a certain extent in Sindh.

Patrilinial descent is central to the configuration of a Biraderi however bonds of marriage, reciprocal obligation and the common political interests also play a significant part in determining its contours. Feudalism is a principal cause of the yawning social and economic gap between the land- ed aristocracy and the rural masses in general.

Ever since landed elite forms the most important locus of political authority. Language has been a source of political mobilization as well as an important identity marker in South Asia. Muslim sepa- ratism in the nineteenth century colonial India was firmly embedded in the Urdu-Hindi controversy which was triggered off in in Banaras.

Ayesha Jalal is of the view that all India Muslim League for its part has always played down the linguistics specificities of the Muslim the majority provinces. Having asserted distinctive Muslim political identity the League sought to strengthen the religious bond through the medium of the Urdu language at the supra- regional level. That was one of the reasons that smaller provinces developed strong reservations for Urdu.

These languages are not only cultural insignia of the particular area where they are spo- ken but they have a political dimension also. Consequently Pak- istan has witnessed many events that had led to ethnic and lin- guistic confrontation as well as bloodshed.

The riots in East Bengal in the and Urdu-Sindhi controversy leading to mur- derous riots in June exemplify that trend. The examples of the countries in South and West Asia ruled by absolute rulers that did not directly experience colo- nialism but could not become democracies by their inner dynamics are cited to support this contention. Nepal, Thailand and Iran are quoted as an example.

According to their contention third world societies would have evolved their own modernity and developed democratic institu- tions had colonialism not scuttled their democratic potential. One tends to concur with Dr. A certain combination of these forces is interacting with local conditions fostered democracy while a different com- bination stifled it.

She therefore, argues that: the British effort to stretch the ambit of imperial control through rule bound institutions based on Western con- cept of contractual law and impersonalized sovereignty rather than on the personal patronage of rulers was without historical precedent in the Sub-Continent, so too were the consequences. A political unity conceived and constructed in cold-blooded fashion and frozen in the impersonal rationality of bureaucratic institutions, could neither reflect nor capture the internal dynamics of a society accustomed to direct personalize rule.

However, the bureaucratic authoritarianism nestled in the colonial state largely remained intact. Therefore, it seemed exceedingly difficult from the very beginning to establish the supremacy of legislative over executive. Pakistani political elite also shirked from undertaking a radical reorganization of the administrative structure of the colonial days to establish the supremacy of elected bodies.

Therefore, the alliances of conven- ience with the bureaucracy were forged on the grounds of prag- matism and need to afford the administrative continuity to grapple with the massive dislocation and law and order prob- lems that followed in the wake of partition in the northern, north western and eastern part of the Sub-Continent.

Ian Talbot while identifying the difference in the administrative measures, deployed in the North-Western areas and the rest of India refers to the arbitrary methods enforced in the areas that subsequently constituted Pakistan. These strictures recounted below precluded the pro- gressive spread of representative institutions.

Preventive detention originating in the Bengal State Prison- ers Regulation III of ; prohibition of political actions seen by magistrates as prejudicial to public order Section of the Criminal Code of Procedure and control of Press Indian Press Emergency Powers Act figured quite prominently. Besides, the Pakistani state reinstituted the Emergency powers of Section 93 as Section 92A of the Government of India Act, enabling the centre to dissolve a Provincial Government.

All these rather stringent measures were indicative of the grave security concerns of the British regarding North Western India. With the sole exception of Eastern Bengal, rest of Pak- istani areas were conquered because of the strategic reasons instead of in pursuance of any economic interests as it was in the case of Southern or Eastern India. Among the territories consti- tuting Pakistan, Sindh was the first to fall to the British in Similarly stiff resistance from the Khalsa Army notwithstanding, British annexed the whole of Punjab in The main motive behind the annexation of the Punjab was indeed defence related.

British paternalism began with the Board of Administration, with Lawrence brother and Mansel, an expert in revenue administration. Immediately after the annexa- tion the force of 8, strong police men was raised to keep tabs on the trouble makers. Besides, the district administrators were fully invested with both administrative and judicial powers.

That region remained the part of the Punjab until the onset of the twentieth century when in the settled districts of the trans-Indus region were conjured up into a separate province from the Punjab. NWFP was kept as a minor province till when it was finally accorded the devolution of powers as set down in the system of diarchy in the Government of India Act. These reforms did not, however, mean much for the frontier province because till s the Gov- ernor had been acting like a tiny autocrat, prohibiting all demonstrations and processions.

Reverting to the perceived security threat from the imperial- ist designs of Russia, in the second half of the 19th century impelled British to transform the Punjab into a military bastion. Thereafter the British came to value the landed elite of the Punjab as their collaborators, pro- viding human fodder to the imperial military machine as and when needed.

By , one third of Indian Army consisted of Punjabis, the pro- portion however increased to three-fifth by Therefore land holding class and the Armed forces established a nexus that had a great bearing on the socio-political life of the areas, constitut- ing Pakistan in Hence, the cooption of the local landed elites not only scuttled the political institutionalisation but culti- vated and sustained the culture of clientelism.

That, as a result, placed insuperable impediments in the growth of democratic institutions and in instituting the socio-economic reforms to become hazardous because of the dominant landed political interests. The nexus, therefore, between landlords and the Army has been one of the most important determinants Pakistani pol- itics right from the very outset.

NWFP attained extra ordinary salience for the imperial interests of the British because of its close proximity to Afghanistan, a site for a constant imperial conflict between Britain and Russia in the 19th century. Same was the reason that galvanized the British attention towards Balochistan where its influence increased steadily after In the course of next thir- ty years British dug its heel in, very firmly in Balochistan partic- ularly by according Kalat and its erstwhile feudatories, the sta- tus of protected states.

Geographical re-configuration was also carried out in by clearly defining the hitherto undecided boundary-line between Iran and Balochistan. After four years as a result of a treaty Khan of Kalat allowed the British to station its troops in Quetta. Hence forth it became an important canton- ment for carrying out military operations during second Afghan War.

Shortly afterwards, Khan of Kalat ceded the whole of Quetta district to the British. Further more, British assumed con- trol over the strategically crucial regions of Sibi and Pishin dur- ing the Afghan war in That expansion continued throughout the remaining years of the 19th Century.

Strategical- ly important Bolan Pass came under British suzerainty in and those areas traversed by Mushkaf-Bolan and Noshki Rail- ways were passed over to them in and respectively. The precedence of executive and military interests over the democratic institutions has far stronger reverberation in Balochistan than any other province of Pakistan.

The power of administrative machinery was enhanced beyond measure by striking alliance with the local Sardars. Ironically the Shahi Jirga comprising fifty four Sardars and five members of the Quetta Municipality took the decision to join Pakistan. Therefore Muham- mad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, fitted into that role quite immaculately and ensconced himself in the position of centrality but at the detriment of the political and constitutional institutions.

He, in fact was the most powerful Governor General of any country in the world. And now that he had won Pakistan within the incredible period of seven years, he had achieved something which no other Muslim leader had even dreamt of. Indeed soon after the announcement of the Partition scheme on 3rd June , he was hailed in New Delhi by Muslims as the Emperor of Pakistan.

In their political vocabulary and comprehension the all powerful king or Shahinshah like the earlier Mughals, the wellspring of all powers could be a true leader. They therefore wanted Jinnah to restore the past glory of the Muslims, which was vanished from the eighteenth century onwards. He could fulfil their expectations by following the footsteps of the Muslim Kings.

Vast majority of the populace was not well conversant with the concept of a democracy or a representative form of gov- ernment. Lack of clarity and understanding about democracy among the people was the foremost impediment in the estab- lishment of the democratic order.

Jinnah being a staunch consti- tutionalist wanted to tread Westminster path therefore he had envisaged the model of a parliamentary democracy for Pakistan. However he assumed the mantle of a Governor General that had generated some contention among the political analysts. It is recognised that the rights of a Dominion include the right of recommending a person for appointment as Governor General. But that the Governor Generalship should be held by an active party politician, who frankly states his intension of continuing his political leadership after assuming the office, is an innovation which radical- ly alters the nature of the Dominion bond.

The develop- ment is the more serious because Mr. His motive in demanding the office of the Governor Gener- al is no doubt to obtain the position which belongs to it in the eyes of the Indian masses. The Viceroy as Gover- nor General has been hitherto, even though to a restrict- ed degree in recent years, the supreme executive ruler and his Ministers have been simply the members of his Executive Council.

By force of mental habit the man in the street will continue to think of the Governor Gener- al as being more important than his Prime Minister. The Governor General drew its authority from the section of Indian Independence Act which vested in him unlimited powers to amend the constitution by a simple degree.

Under the government of India Act the Governor General was empowered to choose and appoint its ministers and he could also dismiss them. Similarly he had a definite say in the matters of defence ecclesiastical and external affairs and also in the administration of tribal areas. The functions and powers vested in the Governor General are listed below: 1.

Maintenance of law and order 2. The safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the federal government 3. The safeguarding of the rights and interest of minorities 4. The prevention of commercial discrimination and action which would subject goods of United Kingdom or Burmese origin imported into India to discriminatory or penal treatment. The protections of the rights of Indian States, etc. Jinnah hailed from Muslim minority provinces, particularly United Provinces and Bihar.

The provinces like Bengal and the Punjab had meagre representation among the ranks of Muslim League. It was primarily because Karshak Praja Party and the Unionist Party did not leave much space for political action for in these provinces until towards the fag end of colonial era.

After independence the central leader- ship of the founder party found itself totally deprived of the electoral base. Shortly afterwards, Punjabis also managed to carve out space for themselves into the glorious cadres of civil service. Hence Muhajir-Punjabi alliance came to act as the fundamental instrument of centralization in the state apparatus.

Omar Noman refers to the major consequences emanating from such a percep- tion. Internally, Jinnah accumulated power at the centre. From to , the Con- stituent Assembly met, on average, for only 16 days a year to frame a constitution. Its central elite deployed Islam and Urdu as symbols to forge unity among the disparate groups and factions. These instruments of homogene- ity proved counter productive particularly with reference to Bengal. One can gainsay the fact that the slogan of Islam was used profusely for the political mobilization in the length and breadth of the country.

The seminaries upholding the puritanical version of Islam were shifted to the major cities of Pakistan. Many of them subscribed to Deobandi school of thought. It had tangible bearing on the state policy. Objective Resolution was an evident testimony to their influence on the government and the functionaries of the state.

Besides, such claus- es provide a sufficient niche to the clerics in the realm of state craft and politics because of their supposed expertise on ecclesi- astical commands of Allah. Anti-Qadiani Movement in was the corollary of the religious activism spearheaded by the Ulema and subsequently it culminated into their denunciation as non- Muslims in Besides, it also provided a back-ground to pol- icy of Islamization subsequently pursued by General Zia-ul-Haq which was punctuated with statutory laws like Hudood Ordi- nance or blasphemy law during Nawaz Sharif era.

The repercus- sions unfolded from the s onwards were the astronomical rise in sectarianism and militancy exemplifying in suicide bombing and target killing. Other variable that helped centralization and transcendence of regional fault lines was the Urdu language. As stated earlier the bulk of Muslim League leadership came from the either UP or Bihar, which had been the breeding ground for the Muslim separatism in Colonial India, Urdu, with particular emphasis on its Persian script was deemed as extremely important symbol of Muslim and Pakistani identity.

Since the days when the Urdu- Hindi controversy had flared up in UP during the closing decade of the nineteenth century, Muslim Ashraaf used Urdu as a symbol to bring the ethnically and culturally divergent Mus- lim together. When Pakistan was founded as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state with Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Mohajirs, Balochis and above all Bengalis constituted around The fact of Bengali majority sent tremors among the ranks of West Pakistani ruling elite comprising Mus- lim League politicians, Bureaucrats and military officers.

That policy of deploying Urdu as an instrument for integration, however, boomeranged and evoked violent responses particularly in East Bengal and in Karachi , in which scores of people lost their lives. In order to counter the Bengali majority the provincial elections were nullified and then all the three provinces namely Punjab, Sindh and North West Frontier along with Balochistan and tribal areas were lumped together into One Unit called West Pakistan in Hence West Pakistan province was carved out.

Now two provinces namely East Pakistan and West Pakistan were given equal representation, thus denying Bengalis their majority in the parliament. NWFP ministry also met the same fate. Change however came but for worse. However before proceeding further, it seems appropriate that the rise of bureaucracy and the tightening of its stranglehold should be dwelled at. In view of the enor- mous difficulties the state of Pakistan has to grapple with some institutional changes were made, enabling the bureaucracy to operate independently of the political leadership.

The most sig- nificant of the all such changes was the subordination of the entire bureaucracy under newly created post of the Secretary General. Hamza contends that the post of the Secretary General was created at the instance of Mr. Jinnah probably advised by the first incumbent of that post himself. Muhammad Ali was appointed as Secretary General, undoubtedly a very capable Punjabi officer with substantial experience in the finance department of Gov- ernment of India.

As a Secretary General, Chaudhry Muham- mad Ali was accorded a direct access to all the federal secre- taries and all the files. Hamza Alvi succinctly explains the functions of the planning committee in the follow- ing words: Through the mechanism of the planning committee, presided over by the Secretary General, the entire state apparatus was able to function as a unified machine under a single head.

Given this mechanism, the Cabinet was bypassed and its proceedings were reduced to meaning- less ritual. Important issues were decided in advance in the Planning committee and the ministers and the Cabi- net acted as mere rubber stamps, ratifying bureaucratic decision with, at best, some minor amendments.

Deci- sions on some large issues were not even referred to the Cabinet on the principle that ignorance is bliss. The Constituent Assembly debates in provided an ample testimony to bureaucratic indifference which has become an ethos on which the Pakistani civil servants were trained and raised in theses debates. Many provincial ministers complained about several officers who refused to carry out their orders because the ministers have no powers to hold those offices accountable.

In fact, Jin- nah himself did not allow potential rivals of any weight and standing to spring up. As a result political leadership of Pak- istan after him was spineless and devoid of any foresight which also had a negative fall out on the party organization of Muslim League. Hence, democracy in Pakistan rested on the shaky and shifting foundations.

Wily and Shrewd Skindar Mirza belonged to the political service of India but he was trained at Sandhurst. At Sandhusrt, during the course of their training both Ayub Khan and Sikander Mirza became friends and that bond lasted till the third week of when Sikander Mirza was deposed from the presidency of Pakistan and sent packing to UK by the former. Hence, without having a full fledge Minister, every thing pertaining to defence ministry was left to Sikander Mirza.

However it did provoke a belated response from the politicians and the Assem- bly attempted to curb the powers of the Governor General in so that the powers to dismiss Prime Minister could be wrested away from him. That move by the politicians proved to be a bit too ambitious. That was the period known for the political intrigues and conspiracies and exhilarated the process that led to the military rule in Sections of the Muslim League leadership did not approve of the appoint- ment on the ground that this ex-congress leader had opposed the creation of Pakistan.

The formation was followed by defections from members of the Muslim League, eager to cross over to a party which had the blessing of the Civil Service. Thus, a series of short lived government was formed. Political par- ties, deprived of real power in the legislature, were reduced to the status of bickering factions controlled by the executive. It had less than 10 percent of the industrial base and a little over 7 of the employment facilities.

Pakistan bequeathed It had a paltry rupee million as its opening cash bal- ances. It was in however that Pakistan government allocated for the first time the meager amount worth Rs. In the first decade after independence the economic policy had three main characteristics; a. At the time of independence there was hardly any large scale industry in the areas constituting Pakistan.

As a result of that practice the areas falling in India after retained the industrial base. On the eve of the Independence, out of top fifty seven Indian companies only one was owned by a Muslim. That group made a windfall profits from Kore- an War bonanza in the early s and invested the same money afterwards on industry. Akbar Zaidi writes: The industrialization process that took place in Pakistan in the mid and the late s was ably nursed through by the bureaucracy, which played perhaps the key role in establishing industrial units in the country.

Moreover, a trade policy that had a forma- tive influence on industry was also actively perused, so that a particular type of industrialization process could take root. One can contest him by saying that bureaucrats, by accumulating the economic resources fur- ther entrenched their control over the state apparatus.

Introduction 39 References 1 Subrata Kumar Mitra ed. Rajan, Real and imagined Women London, The movement in support of the Ben- gali language was suppressed by the state machinery on 21 Febru- ary In the course of that violence many people lost their lives.

Introduction 41 Not only the event is commemorated each year by a Remembrance Day but it also proved to be a beginning of the end. Mitha, Linguistic Nationalism in Pakistan, unpublished M. For over a decade its leadership kept on groping for political stability how- ever bureaucracy and military coalesced to form an oligarchy and the political leaders of the country were consigned to the margins of the polity.

Ayub Khan. Resultant- ly the political edifice of the country was, as if resting on the shifting sands; no government in such circumstances could bide enough time to establish itself on the firm footing. Ibrahim Ismael Chundrigar lasted only for a few months in office. The case of Feroze Khan Noon was no different either. Despite political insta- bility and ever increasing control being exercised by the oli- garchy, the pressure continued to mount incrementally throughout and for holding the elections as provid- ed under the Constitution.

Awami League was expected to sweep the polls in East Pakistan. One thing was, however, certain. Sikander Mirza successfully torpe- doed the election plan of the politicians. That coup dismantled the apparatus of constitutional govern- ment which, given the prospects of general elections, could throw up a new political leadership that would not be pliable enough.

Such a prospect could put an end to the political manipulation of the Governor General and then, after , President Mirza. So, it was not a military coup, as Hamza con- tends, although Martial Law was proclaimed. He believed in absolute centralization of the state structure which implied all powers to be vested in his person. Thus he became the autocrat, with unbridled powers.

Ayub Khan, Salon among the Subalterns, in the words of Ian Talbot, was quickly promot- ed in super session to few of the distinguished senior officers like Gen. Akbar Khan. The reasons like administrative skills and presumed apolitical posture may also be attributed to his rapid rise to the position of power. He was given extension as C-in-C in His apolitical posture is a fact that can easily be contested because he had not only been privy to the political59 intrigue since the days of Ghulam Muhammad but he was also undoubtedly one of the architects of Pakistani political land- scape in s.

Then he was powerful enough to veto any policy which he thought colliding with the interests of armed forces. Whatever may be the case he emerged as the most powerful man in polit- ical sphere in the s, and s. The dominance of the military after independence was aided in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the developing world, by the support provided by the United States. In my own experience, this is conspicuously so in Pakistan…the American military assistance programme is increasingly aware of these possibilities and … had tended to bring military and economic elements in closer contact.

The self perception of the government was pro- vided by the ideological constructs of the modernization theo- ry. The military was projected as modernizers of traditional society. In common with most self images, it was a flattering view. That aspiration on the part of military found its realization in the Constitution that has been discussed below in some length.

To him that constitution was in complete disjunction with the genius of the Pakistani people. Therefore he felt a dire need of another con- stitution for the people and the country which had not yet been ripe for democracy as practiced in the West. Consequently, a new document was prepared and it was promulgated in The fundamental feature of that constitution was concentration of all powers in the hands of Ayub. Hence that constitution warranted a Presidential system of government with extreme- ly powerful President and the federal government.

The provinces lacked sufficient autonomy, making it virtually impossible for the Provincial Governments to function in an autonomous manner. That constitution provided one list of subjects, i. The enhanced powers vested in the President and circumscribed role for the legislatures compromised whatever autonomy was granted to the provinces. As a former Chief Justice of Pakistan has remarked under Constitution, Pakistan practically ceased to be a federation, as the Centre personified by the President enjoyed overwhelming authority over the provinces in important spheres.

Justice M. It was the sole prerogative of the President to appoint Provincial Governors as his agent, whose prime duty was to keep him informed about the political developments in the provinces. That Assembly was not more than a rubber stamp. Routine decision making too was delegated to bureaucra- cy, while Army maintained a low profile and opted not to meddle in the affairs of civil administration. Hence there was hardly any deviation from the state structure whose founda- tions were laid by the British.

Like Viceroy in the Colonial era, Ayub Khan counted root and branch on the steel framework of civil services. The Constitution did not war- rant any space to the political parties. Article gave sanction to any step taken in the national interest. Omar Noman is spot on when he says: The regime made confusion with the establishment of institution without the process of political institutional- ization.

Latter implies legitimacy for the formal struc- tures of public authority. Their establishment without consent may be counter-productive. Instead of neutral- izing political tensions, these institutions become a symbol of mass alienation. Under such circumstances, their significance lies not in the ability to incorporate specific groups but in their capacity to exclude critical sections of the population.

Only those sections of the society were incor- porated which were patronized by the govt. His structure had inbuilt capacity to exclude opposition. Such exclusion forced political communities to adopt violent means to regis- ter protest. The cardinal feature of the political policy formulation was the exclusion of the politicians from the political centre stage.

About 7, individuals were relegated to ignominy through EBDO in Concurrently the Public Safety Ordinances already on the statute book to control news items was re-enforced in letter and spirit. The Progressive Papers Limited was taken over because of its alleged leftist leanings.

On 28 March , publication of any news related to strike and industrial unrest was banned. In the same year, every newspaper was forced to publish press notes issued by the central and Provincial Governments. In order to curb the dissenting voices A National Press Trust was conjured into existence, which was financed by 24 industrialists and patronized by the state. The avowed purpose of its establishment was to foster and promote favourable senti- ments for the Ayub regime.

They were not allowed to publish their work, which had dissenting substance in it. Government did not brook any criticism. Such members of literati or intelligentsia were posted out to the remote places; Safdar Mir was one such example. None of the academics or the member of the faculty with the overt leftist leanings could be employed in the univer- sities. If there were public manifestation of dissent on the part of the academia, they were meted out with the punitive action.

Qudrat Ullah Shahab was particularly instrumental in putting it together with the likes of Jamil-ud-Din Aali. Josh Malih Abadi and Habib Jalib were one of the dissenting voices in that regard. No hard thinking, however, had gone into the formulation of these policies. He firmly believed in controlling all forms of political, social and cultural expressions. Even the judiciary was not spared. Law reforms that were instituted had virtual- ly subjected the courts under the super-ordination of execu- tive.

At the district level judiciary and executive instead of separating were converged in the office of Deputy Commissioner. Regarding the higher rung of judiciary, controlling mechanism from the state functionaries had become a norm. Judges were inter- viewed by Provincial Governors and the President to ascertain their loyalty towards the government.

During the decade of fifties, Bengalis negotiated with other stake- holders in the power politics and aspired to have a share in the Central Government. Constitution of , despite several pitfalls did provide a framework in which the disparate groups and fac- tions could be accommodated to a certain extant. However that constitution did not afford an ideal arrangement. Therefore Ben- galis were frustrated as Military-Bureaucracy oligarchy ruled the roost leaving a little space in the matrix of power for Bengalis but they were not desperate, still looking for the light at the end of the tunnel.

In , elections were planned to be held, and they had a hope to have a democratic dispensation in which they would be the partners. Military- bureaucracy oli- garchy was further strengthened at Bengalis expense. They were also under-represented in the services. Exasperated over the draconian rule of an autocrat, in , the mainstream political parties of East Pakistan presented a notion that in Pakistan there had existed two nations.

That was indeed a clarion call, for the ruling oligarchy and also for the Pres- ident but it responded with non-chalance. What ensued was a national conference in February , held in Lahore, where all the opposition parties convened a conference to discuss their dif- ferences and common interests. More noticeable issue however was the under-representa- tion of politicians from the East Wing. They were led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League, who presented his controversial six-points, which encap- sulated their political and economic program for East Pakistan.

The six points consisted of the following demands that a the government be federal and parliamentary in nature, b its mem- bers would be elected by universal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the basis of distribution of population; c that the federal government would have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense only; d that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts; e that taxation ought to be levied at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants; that each federal Unit is authorized to control its own earnings of foreign exchange; and f each Unit is permitted to raise its own militia or paramilitary forces; on average 4, riots were reported in East Pakistan till The country, therefore, was divided into 80, geographical units with each constituency comprising an average of electorate.

They, according to her, were primarily responsible for selecting the candidates. In that exercise of selecting the representatives of the people, the rural elite got strengthened even further. This arrangement in nomination virtually tipped the balance in favor of the rural politician. The role of industrial labour and intelligentsia, consid- ered to be most volatile sections of the urban societies, was disen- franchised.

Thus Ayub Khan legitimized his position as the President of Pakistan by securing Economic Development or Differential Economic Patronage Economic development, to Ayub Khan, was the panacea to all the problems that Pakistan had been plagued with.

Therefore he launched a comprehensive scheme of economic development which commended by many. Democracy manages to preclude the emergence of monopoly groups; hence wealth does not concen- trate into a few hands. Democracy therefore ensures relatively judicious distribution of the fruit of the development as its impact permeates down to the middle and lower middle echelons of the society.

Thus Ayesha Jalal makes sense when she points towards the politico-economic contradiction that emanated out of the sys- tem of basic democracies, she opines somewhat categorically: The exigencies hence adopted to make the BD system acceptable to whole of society in order to retrieve legiti- macy for the regime was essentially pregnant with politi- co-economic contradiction.

To quell any form of resist- ance from the disenchanted strata of the society the economic progress was considered as the viable solutions. But the BD system was concomitant with differential eco- nomic patronage to the narrowly defined political con- stituency. The assumption that rapid economic growth would trickle down to rest of the society, did not prove to the mark.

As a result of the second five year Plan the large scale manufacturing sector grew at the rate of Investors were pro- vided considerable cushion of fiscal incentives. Trade unions were proscribed and anybody inciting or effecting labour strikes could be charged and sentenced up to two years of imprisonment. A process of dismantling of direct controls on foreign exchange and investment sanctioning was initiated. A considerable increase in the rate of capital inflow into Pakistan was made possible.

Hence increase from 2. The market for man- ufactured goods was made available by expanding the domestic demand instead of resorting to the policy of import substitution as it was the case in the fifties. However, after during third five year Plan period things started going awry. In the wake of war with India, all foreign aid to Pakistan was suspended, although it was resumed a year later but its volume was consid- erably reduced than that envisaged in the third Plan.

The situa- tion could not be improved as large amount of foreign exchange was apportioned for expending on the defense purposes after the war. Such exigencies put a check on the industrial growth, a rise in prices and the re-imposition of controls because of the foreign exchange constraint.

The emphasis on the manufacture of capital goods, as outlined in the Third five year Plan had to be aban- doned and greater focus was riveted on export oriented consumer goods industries. The economic policies pursued by the government, which culminated into the rapid growth rate, gave rise to the tremen- dous political and economic tension. Urban areas were the hub of the mass protest movement spearheaded by the students, the industrial labour class and the lawyers. These demonstrations were triggered off by substantial increase in the prices of the consumer goods, and fed on the immense resentment against the increasing inequalities through- out Pakistan.

Izzat Majeed quotes a social scientist in order to demonstrate the wider impact of the two five year Plans. This type of lopsided industrialization fed on cheap labour provided by the impoverished masses, while social inequalities were maintained and deepened. The Bengalis termed it the consequence of ethnic composition of military and bureaucratic elite.

In fact it was not a coincidence that the benefi- ciaries were either Muhajirs or Punjabis. National integration had to be constructed on the basis of policies and institutions. Growth Rates Per capita income 3. The Land Reforms Regulation was brought into force on 7 February which had been indeed a serious attempt at land reform in West Pakistan, which was dominated by the landlords. The high ceiling was acres of irrigated land or acres of un-irrigated land. However, intra-family transfers along with numerous other irregularities severely restricted the amount of land which was resumed.

Big land holdings continued to exist and their owners kept on ruddering the destiny of this hapless country. Instead of reminding people of the achievements of the Ayub Khan regime, the festivities high- lighted the frustrations of the urban poor afflicted by inflation and the costs of the war. For the masses, Ayub Khan had become the symbol of inequality. Bhutto capitalized on this and challenged Ayub Khan. In East Pakistan, dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than opposition to Ayub Khan.

By it was obvious that except for the military and the civil service, Ayub Khan had lost most of his support. The constitu- tion was abrogated, Ayub Khan announced his resigna- tion, and Yahya Khan assumed the presidency. Yahya Khan soon promised elections on the basis of adult fran- chise to the National Assembly, which would draw up a new constitution. He also entered into discussions with leaders of political parties.

Not only he is jeered and con- demned for some of his personal oddities but also for the alleged role, he played in the separation of East Pakistan. All nuances and subtleties of the historical process are convenient- ly overlooked. The role of Yahya Khan in effecting such an omi- nous change from Pakistani standpoint cannot be vindicated however it is also not justifiable to put all the blame of such event onto him as myriad currents and cross-currents wove the complex cobweb of historical course culminating into the dis- memberment of Pakistan.

That pre- carious situation was compounded because the pendulum of divisive tendency had already swung and reached the extreme end. Yahya did not have the political acumen and insight nor the energy and the will to redeem a country that was stuck in the quagmire of knotty tangles. All said and done, Yahya regime was not a departure from the past rather it was a contin- uation.

It was a much chastened military leadership, although it was clear that Yahya Khan represented a continuation of Ayub Khan, who personally had to go because he had come to symbolize a hated regime. Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan was born in Chakwal on 4th February to a Shia Qizilbash family of Persian decent who could trace its mil- itary links to the time of Nadir Shah. His father Saadat Ali Khan hailed from Peshawar.

Yahya did his graduation from the Pun- jab University with flying colours. During the 2nd World War , he took part in military action against the axis power in North Africa, Iraq and Italy. In the course of a military campaign he was once captured by axis forces but successfully escaped from the prisoner camp in Italy in his third attempt.

His role in setting up the Pakistan Staff College at Quetta is indeed commendable. He commanded an infantry division during September war against India. In the wake of wide spread turmoil and agitation, Ayub Khan ran out of all options but to relinquish power for Gen. Yahya Khan to take-over. He, immediately after coming to power declared Martial Law in the country on March 25, and assumed the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator. Only six days later, he, though reluctantly assumed the office of Pres- ident as well.

On March 29, , through an Ordinance the interim Con- stitution in the form of the Legal Framework Order was draft- ed. It in fact provided a modus operandi for the holding of the forthcoming elections. Yahya Khan made a commitment to return to the civilian rule under a re-drafted constitution. He also agreed that representation in the Assembly should be determined by population distribution, ensuring that East Pak- istan would have more seats than West Pakistan. On 7th December , the first elections since the creation of Pakistan were held for which Yahya deserves a due credit.

However these elections could not restore political normalcy in the country. Instead political turmoil was com- pounded because the elections threw up a split mandate. Thereby, neither Bhutto nor Mujib was ready to accept his adversary as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, which vitiated the political climate of the country. Both of them remained obdurate over the convening of the session of the National Assembly thus the impasse continued.

Now it was up to Yahya to take a decisive action but he messed up the situa- tion even further. Political agitation became a recurrent feature in East Pakistan. The coercive policies of Pakistani state and Indian intrusion aggravated the situation. This resulted in war between India and Pakistan in that culminated into the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Yahya had to resign and put in a house arrest by his successor Z. He breathed his last on 10th August, in Rawalpindi. Problems inherited from Ayub Anarchy and chaos reigned supreme when Gen. Therefore people heaved a sigh of relief when Martial law was enforced. Quite conversely when Gen. Yahya seized power, the political leaders had salvaged their lost reputation to a substantial extent and also regained the mass support. Only one infantry division aided by a squadron of Korean War, vintage US-built F Sabre jets was what had been available for East Pakistan to feel content with, against vastly superior adversary.

Thus the demand for an independent defense capability started finding resonance among the Bengalis. Quite contrary to what is being propagated in the Pakistani textbooks and media, the Opera- tion Gibraltor failed to achieve the desired target, of liberating Kashmir. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the most prominent among them. According to Talbot, however, the Agartala contacts did not provide solid evidence, suggest- ing Mujib at the behest of India hatched secessionist conspiracy in East Pakistan.

Therefore the trial against the accused proved to be extremely counter-productive particularly in such a volatile political atmosphere. Mujibur Rahman was already behind the bars since May causing indignation among the Bengali bourgeoisie.

How- ever when the reports of police torture were revealed to the public, Mujib and his co-defendants took on the status of mar- tyrs. In East Pakistan the powder keg was virtually ignited when one of the defendants, Sergeant Zahurul Haq was tor- tured to death while in custody.

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