There could therefore be a risk of confusion for persons and the public at large as to the extent of its powers. The SC notes that the distinction between internal and external investigations has also been removed also and endeavours to understand the reasons supporting this change given that this categorisation is provided for in the text of the amended Reform, as well as in the previous ISIP.
The SC would suggest it to be of a particular importance to maintain this distinction, since the powers and the investigative measures OLAF is entitled to carry out do not appear to be similar, according the scope of the investigation. The scope of the legality check during an investigation.
The ISIP establishes a prior legality check of specific and limited investigative measures. The text of the Reform has specifically foreseen that the Director-General shall put in place an internal advisory and control procedure including a legality check relating, inter alia, to respect … of the national law of the Member States concerned.
It appears therefore that the ISIP should include provisions for organising a wider internal control covering, in particular, verification of the consistency of the gathering of elements for investigations when requested from Member States. Cooperation with others agencies Europol, Eurojust.
The ISIP do not contain provisions relating to the rules applicable for the implementation of cooperation, in particular the content and procedures for the exchange of information with other agencies liable to carry out investigations or to coordinate action by Member States in the areas of competence shared with OLAF. Decisions of the Director-General.
In order to ensure transparency and impartiality where the Director-General decides not to follow the opinion of the ISRU at important stages inter alia , the opening or dismissal of cases, closure decisions, extension of the scope of an investigation , the ISIP should provide a reasoned decision from the Director-General.
This wording should be clarified, in light of recital 6 of the amended Regulation. Article The SC would like, in particular, to know the reasons for the modifications to the following Articles:. Present supervision structure. The SC focuses in particular on examining whether fundamental rights and procedural guarantees are respected in OLAF's investigations and whether the cases are dealt with efficiently, effectively, in due time and according to the relevant rules and legal provisions.
SC recommendations and Commission proposals. In its Annual Activity Report in particular in Section 2 of Annex III , the SC recommended, on the basis of its monitoring experience and in view of the identified shortcomings, a number of actions aiming at reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF's investigations. The SC recommended in particular introduction of transparent and stable procedures for the internal legality check and for independent review of complaints.
The SC recommended also clarification of OLAF's powers in different types of administrative investigations and insisted on providing the SC with effective tools for monitoring the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights by OLAF.
That need to strengthen the procedural safeguards and legality checks seems to be a common conclusion of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the SC as expressed in their exchanges of opinions on OLAF investigative activities. Creation of the EPPO would be a change of paradigm by transferring cases of possible criminal fraud from administrative investigations in OLAF to criminal investigations conducted by European prosecutors.
Such change is to result in a substantial reinforcement of the procedural guarantees for persons concerned by investigations. Even with the establishment of the EPPO, OLAF would still have a significant role to play in the protection of the EU against offences and irregularities affecting its financial interests. There is a high degree of uncertainty when it comes to the geographical coverage of the EPPO which most probably will be established by enhanced cooperation of some Member States — their number remains unknown, but almost surely not all of them are going to participate.
The SC is currently analysing possible consequences of particular solutions proposed there and is looking forward to discussing them with the Institutions and with OLAF. As the first reflection, the SC considers the substance of the proposals as positive, providing for instruments potentially enabling to improve the current level of safeguards.
At the same time, some structural solutions, as proposed in the Communication, should be reconsidered with particular regard to the independence of OLAF and of the SC, to ensure avoiding conflicts of competences with respect to the supervision of OLAF as well as duplication of work and inefficient allocation of resources.
New bodies and their competences. At this stage, the SC is considering specifically the issues of the institutional framework for two new offices proposed by the Commission and the scope of their competences. Even if the differentiation between the tasks of the Controller and of the SC could be possible argued on a theoretical level, the practical experience of the SC shows that review of individual cases is an indispensable element of systemic monitoring of OLAF.
Therefore, the daily work — in the separate secretariats of both bodies — would be very similar and consist in examination of individual case files in view of respect of procedural rights and duration of investigation. In its systemic analyses based on samples of individual cases, the SC could be examining, coincidently and even unknowingly, the same case as would be examined by the Controller in the framework of his individual review.
It could lead not only to redundant duplication of work, but also to issuing diverging or even conflicting recommendations to the Director-General of OLAF. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to establish an office of a judicial reviewer who would authorise OLAF's intrusive investigative measures concerning Members of EU Institutions. The reviewer's competences, his punctual interventions and his placement within or next to the Commission could raise serious concerns as regards OLAF's independence.
In view of his placement, his competence to advise on investigative measures against Members of the Commission but also of other Institutions could affect the interinstitutional balance. Also as regards the Controller, who would be similarly placed and separated from the SC, there could be concerns with regard to his independence and to the cost effectiveness of him having a separate secretariat doing the job currently done by the SC's Secretariat. Creation of two additional offices controlling OLAF but separate from the Supervisory Committee of OLAF would lead to multiplication of independent supervising structures, probably resulting in confusion or conflict of competences and duplication of work.
That could ultimately decrease the efficiency of the supervision of OLAF. The SC is considering other options which would retain the useful instruments proposed by the Commission, but which would at the same time incorporate them into a comprehensive and effective supervision structure. To achieve the important aim of reinforcing the procedural safeguards in OLAF set forth by the Communication, the Controller should form a part of a wider supervisory committee. His independence would be strengthened and he could benefit from the expertise of the SC and its Secretariat having a long experience in examining the respect of procedural guarantees in OLAF.
The whole joint structure would be stronger, more efficient and would produce an effect of synergy. A common secretariat would ensure consistency, economy of scale and allow avoiding duplication of work. As regards the judicial reviewer, he could be, theoretically, also attached to a wider supervisory committee to benefit from the knowledge and independent resources of the already established structure.
Therefore, it seems more logical to place the judicial review back in a dedicated judicial unit within OLAF which would consist, as it used to be the case, of national magistrates. The SC would continue to monitor, ex post , the judicial recommendations to the Director-General and his ensuing decisions, with a view of ensuring OLAF's independence, on the one hand, and the procedural rights of persons concerned, on the other.
In the light of its monitoring experience, the SC supports the Commission's proposal to reinforce the procedural safeguards in OLAF investigations. It is particularly recommendable having regard to the abolition in the reformed OLAF of the SC's prior examination of the respect of fundamental right and procedural guarantees before an OLAF case is sent to national judicial authorities — which was considered by the Court of Justice as a crucial safeguard for persons concerned.
The improved supervisory structure must be functional and efficient. The SC is looking forward to the forthcoming exchange of opinions between the Institutions under the new OLAF Regulation which could focus on working out optimal and broadly supported legislative solutions. OLAF did not analyse its competence to gather evidence by way of recording private telephone conversations which seems contrary to Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. OLAF to make necessarily such a legal analysis.
OLAF to fulfil this legal obligation without delay. OLAF to ensure that persons concerned are informed of each fact concerning them in a clear and accurate manner, with an expressly separate question asked for each particular allegation, so that they can express views on all the facts concerning them.
OLAF to inform the SC of all complaints related to fundamental rights and procedural guarantees to allow the SC to fulfil properly its monitoring remit. OLAF to differentiate clearly, where it is relevant, between its powers and legal basis applicable to external vs.
OLAF to ensure compliance with national rules for collection of evidence within the framework of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by establishing a procedure for legality check including the relevant national legal provisions. OLAF to reconsider high financial thresholds for opening investigations and to introduce a follow-up procedure for cases dismissed on that basis, to avoid the risk of creating areas of impunity. DG not to participate personally in investigative activities interviews, on-the-spot checks, etc.
OLAF to follow rigorous the legal requirements on notifications to the institutions concerned by the opening of an investigation. An effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured incl. OLAF to develop a human resources strategy based on a needs assessment, with focus on training, career development also for temporary agents , succession planning and justified division of tasks among administrators and assistants.
OLAF must ensure that information provided to the SC is reliable, accurate and reflects exactly the content of the case file. OLAF to ensure independent functioning of the SC Secretariat as a precondition of the independence and effective functioning of the SC itself, in particular: staff to be appointed, evaluated and promoted on the basis of SC opinions.
Mission and role of the Supervisory Committee. To accomplish this mission, the SC was entrusted with a threefold role:. Core tasks of the Supervisory Committee. The core tasks of the SC are also defined by the Regulation from this triple perspective.
In the framework of its advisory role , the SC provides consultation to the DG:. The SC underlines that opinions issued at the request of the DG or by an institution, body, office or agency should relate to the core activities of the SC and should not interfere with the conduct of investigations in progress, or put the independence and the objectivity of the SC at risk.
The SC's monitoring is carried out both on a systemic level and on a case-by-case basis, using a matrix review of OLAF investigative activities: the SC collects and examines information concerning OLAF's cases horizontally and on sampling bases for the purpose of systemic and structural analyses; in addition it examines individual files or their components in order to obtain a more profound and concrete understanding of sensitive areas.
The SC's monitoring experience, based on examination of individual case files or their representative samples , on information regularly forwarded by the DG as well as on the SC Members' specific knowledge savoir-faire of investigations, allows the SC to provide particular added value to the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function.
The SC thus effectively contributes to ensuring, within OLAF, good administration, good governance and respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees as set out in EU law. The SCS staff members, legal and operational experts, prepare and carry out the initial examination of those matters subject to the SC monitoring and present the results for the SC Members' consideration.
Independent functioning of the Secretariat. It is crucial that the SCS be able to assist the SC in the implementation of its monitoring functions in a loyal and efficient manner without being exposed to the risks of potential conflicts of interest as OLAF staff subordinate to the DG. The recruitment of the Head of the SCS should be done through an open competition to reinforce the independent nature of the SC.
His appraisal and promotion should be decided on the basis of input from the SC Chairman. This would mean, for example, that authorisation of missions for the SCS staff and their participation at public events on behalf of the SC be sub-delegated to the Head of the SCS and thus reinforce the ability of the SC Members to carry out their duties efficiently and to work with their Secretariat in a flexible manner.
In the light of the mission and tasks entrusted to it by the Regulation, the SC hereby defines its strategic objectives for the forthcoming period of its mandate, aiming at increasing the effectiveness and impact of its core activities and thus at supporting OLAF's investigative function and reinforcing OLAF's investigative independence. To meet these objectives, the SC has identified the following priorities. Objective 1: Develop effective and pragmatic monitoring tools. Define and use criteria for the sampling of OLAF cases.
Define and use random, statistical and risk-based criteria for the selection of representative samples of OLAF cases. Rely on the experience of experts from Member States. Return to the practice of hearing these experts for the purpose of the preparation of the SC activity reports and opinions. Consider the possibility to occasionally organise the SC's plenary meetings in some of the Member States, in order to gather — from national experts — information and evidence on subjects precisely defined in advance.
Agree on new working arrangements with OLAF. Organise regular exchanges of views with the Director-General. Establish a direct reporting and consultation line with the DG and regularly invite him to the SC's plenary meetings. Objective 3: Act as an important player in the fight against fraud. Participate in the exchange of views with the institutions.
Actively participate in the exchange of views with the EU institutions and the DG. Use this new inter-institutional forum as a platform for discussing the results of its monitoring as presented in the SC's opinions, reports and activity reports.
Ensure that the exchange of views represents a positive arena for discussion and for assessment of the effectiveness of OLAF's work and thus becomes an asset in the fight against fraud. Hold regular yearly meetings with the three appointing EU institutions and with the European Court of Auditors at least every two years. Hold bilateral meetings with the Commissioner responsible for the fight against fraud at least once a year. Take a proactive role in the legislative process concerning the revision of the EU antifraud legislation.
Develop an effective communication strategy. Change the format of the activity report, in order to better reflect the reinforced role and the core activities of the SC. Increase interaction with stakeholders on a broader range of issues.
Objective 5: Develop the SC's working methods. Ensure a consistent approach in monitoring OLAF cases. Update the SC's Rules of procedure. Update the SC's Rules of procedure, in order to reflect the changes brought about by the new Regulation. Develop an ethical code of conduct. Objective 6: Safeguard the independent functioning of the SC and its Secretariat.
Advocate the modernisation of the remuneration and financial arrangements for the SC's Members. Alternatively, the arrangements concerning principal advisors in the European Commission's Bureau of European Policy Advisers could be applied. He shall be permitted to sub-delegate those powers …. The total appropriations for the Office, including for the Supervisory Committee and its secretariat, shall be entered under a specific budget line within the section of the general budget of the European Union relating to the Commission and shall be set out in detail in an Annex to that section.
The establishment plan of the Office, including the secretariat of the Supervisory Committee, shall be annexed to the establishment plan of the Commission. They shall refrain from any activities which may jeopardise or may appear to jeopardise the independence and impartiality of the SC. Members of the SC shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence.
Members of the SC shall avoid participation in the examination of individual cases concurrently as the responsible officials of a competent national authority and as SC Members. An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he or the services which he directs or over which he exercises effective control or influence are conducting or assist OLAF in conducting an investigation related to that case.
An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he directs or exercises effective control or influence over national judicial or administrative proceedings related to that case. An SC Member in a judicial or administrative position may withdraw, in accordance with national provisions on impartiality, from national proceedings related to an individual case if he participated as SC Member in the SC proceedings related to that case.
SC Members shall inform the Chairman and the Secretary without delay of the situations referred to in paragraphs Documents drawn up following SC proceedings on an individual case shall clearly indicate if any SC Member withdrew from the proceedings or if any of them participated in his capacity as a national judicial or administrative official. Prior to sending to an SC Member any information related to a case to be transmitted to his national authorities, the Secretariat of the SC shall provide such Member with an opportunity to withdraw from the SC proceedings on that case.
Explanatory memorandum on the Code of Conduct of the Members of the Supervisory Committee: safeguards of impartiality and risks of conflict of interest in the exercise of the monitoring functions. The membership of the SC is a parttime function. At the same time, they regularly monitor OLAF's cases, in particular those where information has been transmitted to national judicial authorities.
Situations may thus occur when they are to deal with the same OLAF case both in the framework of their national duties and as the SC Members. It is essential to make sure that dealing with a case in this dual capacity does not give rise to actual or potential conflicts of interest and then endanger impartiality and objectivity as well as the public trust in the impartiality and objectivity in the exercise of the national functions of the SC Members or in the discharge of their duties in the SC.
Actual or potential conflicts of interests could have a negative impact on the impartiality of the decisions taken and on the quality of their work, could damage their reputation and undermine both the EU institutions' and the public's trust in the SC. Given the potential risks involved, it is important therefore to identify the risk areas for conflict of interest situations in order to prevent them.
To do so, after defining the conflict of interest part 1 , it is necessary to make an overview of the specific tasks of the SC Members which may possibly lead to conflict of interest situations part 2 , followed by an inventory of concrete situations when conflicts of interest may occur part 3. Finally, a clear procedure on how to manage conflict of interest situations is also necessary part 4. The requirement of impartiality and objectivity and the obligation to avoid situations in which appearance may give rise to doubts with regard to objectivity and impartiality is also reflected in Article of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which stipulates that, in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration.
Independence here refers generally to objectivity and impartiality. Even though this provision concerns directly only the SC Secretariat composed of EU officials , it expresses a general principle of Union law guiding also the activities of the SC itself. The above mentioned acts do not define the concept of conflict of interest.
Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official duties. The public official's private interest includes any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political relations.
This definition of conflict of interest has three dimensions: i the existence of a private or personal interest of a public official, which ii comes into conflict with his official duty, and thus iii leads to a conflict of interest interfering with professional principles. Conflict of interest was also defined in the EU case-law. Although the Members of the SC are not bound by the Staff Regulations, the interpretation of the Court is relevant on the matter since the wording of the legal provisions concerning conflict of interest — in the Staff Regulations and in the Decision on their appointment — is quite similar.
They are an expression of the same underlying general principles of EU law enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The term conflict of interest as defined above does not, however, take into account expressly all the situations in which the impartiality and independence as well as the appearance of impartiality and independence of the SC Members may actually or potentially be endangered. Classic conflict of interest concerns situations in which a public official may have a private interest in conflict with his or her public duties.
In the case of the SC Members, the independence and impartiality could be jeopardised also due to their dual roles as high national judicial or administrative officials and SC Members at the same time. Generally, the national in-depth expertise is of great benefit for the discharge of the duties of the SC. This may raise the issue as to whether the judgment of the SC is, or appears to be independent of the judgment and proceedings of national authorities, or whether the data protection and confidentiality requirements either by national law or by Union law are fully observed.
In addition, it is important for the independence and impartiality of the SC Members that the third parties understand in all communications in which capacity the SC Members are acting. The analyses of and the measures related to the conflict of interest situations shall cover, in particular, the situation of concurrent duties as national officials and SC Members.
The particular situation of the SC Members arises from the principle that they have their national duties as their primary public obligations. The duties of the SC include, inter alia, the regular monitoring of the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function, in order to reinforce the Office's independence in the proper exercise of its competences and, in particular, the monitoring of developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations in the light of the information supplied by the Director-General of OLAF.
In duly justified situations, the SC may ask OLAF for additional information on investigations, including reports and recommendations on closed investigations, without however interfering with the conduct of investigations in progress. They are generally national officials, and as SC Members they are appointed by three EU institutions and exercise a mission of public interest.
There may be potentially other situations where the risk of a conflict of interest is not that obvious. They should be assessed on a case by case basis in order to establish in concreto whether there are real risks of lack of independence or impartiality, liable to affect the capability to evaluate cases in an impartial and independent manner.
The SC considers that in order to maintain the high integrity of the SC and to ensure a high level of public trust in the proper supervision of the investigative activities of OLAF and in the independence and impartiality of the SC, it will benefit from the establishment of more comprehensive guidance on the matter and more detailed procedures to be followed. Therefore, the SC adopts hereby its Code of Conduct supplemented by this explanatory memorandum. General information on OLAF's activity.
The DG will forward to the SC the draft investigative policy priorities, prior to their publication and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments. The draft will be accompanied by documents and background information on the basis of which the investigative policy priorities have been formulated. The DG will forward to the SC the preliminary draft budget, prior to its sending to the Director-General for Budgets and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments.
The draft will be accompanied by explanations of changes introduced to the draft as compared to the previous budget. The DG will forward to the SC the draft guidelines on investigation procedures or any modifications thereto, prior to their adoption and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments.
The draft modifications will be accompanied by explanation of reasons for their introduction. Specific information on OLAF's cases. The DG will provide the SC with a list of cases in which he has issued recommendations, specifying the recipient and the type of recommendation. The DG will report annually to the SC on cases in which recommendations have not been followed.
In addition, the DG will send to the SC an annual summary report on the implementation of his recommendations. The DG will forward to the SC a list of cases in which information has been transmitted to national judicial authorities, together with a copy of the transmission letter. The DG will report to the SC on investigations which have not been closed within 12 months, indicating the reasons for which it was not possible to complete the investigation and the remedial measures, envisaged with a view to speeding up the investigation.
The reports will be drawn at the expiry of the month period and every six months thereafter. The DG will forward to the SC, after the closure of the investigation, the reasoned decision to defer the information to the institution, body, office or agency to which a person concerned by an internal investigation belongs.
The DG will also inform the SC of the date when the institution, body, office or agency was provided with the deferred information. The staff members of the SC Secretariat shall have access to metadata of cases by means of automated searches in OLAF's case management database, including:.
The Head of the SC Secretariat and the staff members authorised by him will have special access to limited data in the OLAF case management database on the basis of self-validation which confirms that this level of access is justified. Requests for additional information on investigations, pursuant to Article 15 1 fifth paragraph of the Regulation, including access to a case file, also by sampling, shall be made by the SC to the DG in writing, with due justification.
The request shall be signed by the SC Chairman or the SC Member appointed by the SC to act as a rapporteur responsible for a given monitoring activity. When the request concerns also access to personal data, the SC shall justify why it is necessary. The SC determines the purpose and scope of its monitoring activities, within the framework set by the relevant legislation. On that basis the SC provides the due justification for individual requests. The DG shall reply to SC requests for additional information within 15 working days.
When the DG considers it impossible to provide the requested additional information within the 15 working days, it shall, within this time limit, explain the reasons and propose a new date for transmission of the requested information. When the SC considers it necessary for monitoring of the implementation of OLAF's investigative function, it may request additional information, including, inter alia :.
When the SC considers that it is necessary for monitoring of the implementation of OLAF's investigative function and that the otherwise accessible information is not sufficient in a given case, the SC may request partial or full access to an OLAF case file.
Access to the case file will be granted to specified staff members of the SC Secretariat for a specified duration which may be extended upon written request. Where the SC decides to monitor a systemic issue on the basis of sampling of cases which requires additional information or access to OLAF case files, the SC will inform the DG of the criteria for the selection and will request the necessary information or access.
The SC, in close consultation with the DG, will select a representative sample of cases, following statistical or risk-based sampling. The DG may delegate in writing the exercise of his functions under these Working Arrangements to one or more members of the staff of the Office. After one year from the date of the signature of these arrangements, the SC and the DG will evaluate their implementation and may propose, if appropriate, any necessary amendments. Step 1 is covered by Article 10, step 2 — by Article 11 and step 3 — by Articles Whenever personal data are transferred to SC, the SC takes adequate measures to ensure confidentiality and proper handling of such data according to the EU law on personal data protection.
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Multilingual display. Recomendaciones del CV de 8. Acuerdos de trabajo con la OLAF. Allocation of resources to priority activities The SC has regularly recommended to OLAF in its previous opinions on the budget to allocate more staff to OLAF's core business — investigations — by shifting them from the support units. Opening and follow up of the investigations The SC would mention that consistent application over the years of the investigative policy priorities in line with Union's anti-fraud policy and the Commission's anti-fraud strategy is a core issue in the resources management of OLAF and in the performance of its investigative function.
HR strategy The reorganisation of the Office resulted in significant shifts of staff and modifications in their job description or even a completely new allocation of tasks. Recommendations: — Effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured and results of the investigations reported with timely and reliable indicators — OLAF shall continue to develop indicators describing the efficiency and quality of its investigative function and on the alignment with the anti-fraud policy of the European Union and anti-fraud strategy of the European Commission — A human resources strategy based on a needs assessment of OLAF's current activities should be developed and focus given to training, career development, succession planning and appropriate balance between assistants providing support services and administrators performing core investigative tasks.
Secretariat Staff The SC maintains its position, as expressed in its previous opinions on the OLAF budget, on the minimum requirement of eight Secretariat staff, which is equivalent to the current needs of the SC. Recommendations: — Separate budget line for both the SC and Secretariat should be considered to clearly indicate the costs of the SC function and to highlight in a transparent manner the inter-institutional character of the SC and its Secretariat.
The SC would indicate three possible solutions to that problem. IPPs for 29 I. Draft IPPs for 30 I. Need to clarify the policy on financial indicators 31 II. IPPs for 3. IPPs for 6. Those general principles include: i proportionality of the means employed, ii efficient use of resources, iii added value of an OLAF internal investigation , taking into account the nature of an illegal activity and its financial impact.
The SC welcomes the fact that, following its comments expressed during technical meetings, the Director-General included in the draft IPPs for only those elements which can be clearly considered under the Regulation as priorities and not principles. Need to clarify the policy on financial indicators The SC welcomes the fact that, following its comments expressed in its Activity Report for , the Director-General decided to review the policy on financial indicators.
The SC is, however, concerned that, as the result, the DG has completely excluded any financial indicators from the draft IPPs for , leaving the unit responsible for case selection without any concrete guidance in this respect. In light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee: 1 recommends that the Director General issue guidelines on application of the three selection principles established by the Regulation, including on the application of financial indicators as a proportionality criterion; 2 recommends that the Director General enter into a constructive dialogue with the stakeholders on the determination and implementation of IPPs, in particular with regard to financial indicators and possible follow-up of dismissed cases; 3 requests the Director General to provide the SC, by 6 March , with an assessment of the results of the implementation of the IPPs for and together with a summary of the feedback provided by the stakeholders; in the following years those documents should be attached to the new draft IPPs transmitted annually to the SC.
Scope and purpose of the SC's review 2. Methodology 4. In particular, OLAF should: a Increase the number of selectors with investigative experience; b Apply the principle of specialisation of selectors more rigorously; c Ensure that the selectors have the appropriate legal, linguistic and sectorial expertise and provide them with sufficient training; d Improve the functioning of the FNS, in order to allow it to cope with the upload of documents of greater size; e Adopt proper procedures for dealing with whistle-blowers.
Recommendation 2: Separate structurally the selectors from the reviewers OLAF should place the selectors in an organisational structure separate from the reviewers. Need to improve the application of the selection criteria Recommendation 5: Clarify the application of the proportionality principle OLAF should clarify the application of the proportionality principle and provide the selectors with clearer guidelines.
Recommendation 8: Improve the quality of the motivation of opinions OLAF should improve the quality, clarity and consistency of the motivation of the opinions on opening decision. These pre-determined lists could include references to: a relevant legal instruments to be used when assessing OLAF's competence to act ; b concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the reliability of the source, credibility of the allegations and sufficiency of suspicions to be used when evaluating the sufficiency of information ; c concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the IPPs.
Need to increase transparency of the selection process Recommendation 9: Increase transparency of the selection process OLAF should improve the transparency of the selection process. In particular, OLAF should: a Give better feedback to the source of information on the action not taken by OLAF following the information provided by the source; b Reinforce internal consultation and the exchange of information between the ISRU, and the investigation and investigation support units.
Recommendation Improve the clarity of conclusions of opinions Further improvements are needed with regard to the conclusions drawn up at the completion of the selection process, which should clearly specify the actions that OLAF should take following a decision to dismiss or open an investigation or coordination case.
In particular, conclusions of opinions should clearly mention the actions that OLAF intends to take upon completion of the selection process, such as: a to inform the national or EU authorities better placed to act; b to protect or not the identity of the source; c to inform or not the source of information of OLAF's decisions. Need to improve the reporting to the SC Final remarks and recommendation Figure 2 1. Figure 3 Distribution of cases dismissed by sector Figure 4 Distribution of cases opened by sector Figure 5 Reasons for dismissing cases This will entail checking whether: — OLAF has sole competence in certain matters in relation to EU staff or whether there is an identifiable authority that can act — One or several authorities have requested the assistance of OLAF in a complex case and OLAF is therefore in a position to add value — An OLAF investigation could add value in terms of recovery, prosecution or deterrence to the control activities already carried out by other EU or national bodies The selection procedure chapter 1 Decision on the opening of a case Regarding the conditions governing the opening of cases, the ISIP refer, in Article 5.
The measures the ISRU is entitled to take prior to the decision whether to open a case The ISIP provide the possibility, inter alia, to take a statement from any person able to provide relevant information. The internal competencies within the ISRU Whilst enjoying the power of assessment and proposal to open an investigation, the ISRU has, in addition, the responsibility for reviewing the legality of a certain number of investigative measures as foreseen by the investigation units.
Dismissed cases where there are grounds for sufficient suspicion As pointed out by the SC in its annual report, the text of the Reform strengthens the primacy of the principal of opportunity in the opening or investigations without establishing a subsequent duty for the Director-General to inform the competent authorities of the Member State or the institution concerned when he decides not to open an investigation.
The provisions regarding the investigations and coordination cases chapter II The nature of the investigations The SC notes that any reference to the administrative nature of the investigative measures OLAF is entitled to conduct has been deleted. The scope of the legality check during an investigation The ISIP establishes a prior legality check of specific and limited investigative measures.
Cooperation with others agencies Europol, Eurojust The ISIP do not contain provisions relating to the rules applicable for the implementation of cooperation, in particular the content and procedures for the exchange of information with other agencies liable to carry out investigations or to coordinate action by Member States in the areas of competence shared with OLAF. Decisions of the Director-General In order to ensure transparency and impartiality where the Director-General decides not to follow the opinion of the ISRU at important stages inter alia , the opening or dismissal of cases, closure decisions, extension of the scope of an investigation , the ISIP should provide a reasoned decision from the Director-General.
SC recommendations and Commission proposals 2. New bodies and their competences 7. Alternative solutions Whistle-blowers Activity Report p. External vs. Legality check incl. IPPs 12 OLAF to reconsider high financial thresholds for opening investigations and to introduce a follow-up procedure for cases dismissed on that basis, to avoid the risk of creating areas of impunity.
HR strategy 17 OLAF to develop a human resources strategy based on a needs assessment, with focus on training, career development also for temporary agents , succession planning and justified division of tasks among administrators and assistants. SC's access to data Activity Report p. Mission and role of the Supervisory Committee 61 1. Core tasks of the Supervisory Committee 61 1.
Reporting 61 1. Access to information 62 2. Role of the Secretariat 62 3. Independent functioning of the Secretariat 63 4. Mission and role of the Supervisory Committee 2. Core tasks of the Supervisory Committee 3.
Reporting 4. Access to information 6. Role of the Secretariat Independent functioning of the Secretariat Objective 1: Develop effective and pragmatic monitoring tools 1. Define and use criteria for the sampling of OLAF cases — Define and use random, statistical and risk-based criteria for the selection of representative samples of OLAF cases. Organise regular exchanges of views with the Director-General — Establish a direct reporting and consultation line with the DG and regularly invite him to the SC's plenary meetings.
Objective 3: Act as an important player in the fight against fraud 1. Participate in the exchange of views with the institutions — Actively participate in the exchange of views with the EU institutions and the DG. Hold bilateral meetings — Hold regular yearly meetings with the three appointing EU institutions and with the European Court of Auditors at least every two years. Develop an effective communication strategy 2. Objective 5: Develop the SC's working methods 1. Develop an ethical code of conduct — Develop an ethical code of conduct for the use of the SC Members.
Objective 6: Safeguard the independent functioning of the SC and its Secretariat — Advocate the modernisation of the remuneration and financial arrangements for the SC's Members. This information will be provided annually. Article 2 Implementation of investigative function and follow-up Art.
The DG will forward to the SC: a the Annual Management Plan, b the Annual Activity Report, c a mid-term report and an end-of-year report on the implementation of the investigative function, reflecting the objectives set out in the annual management plan.
Article 3 Budget Art. Article 4 Independence Art. Article 5 Guidelines on investigation procedures Art. Article 7 Cases transmitted to national judicial authorities Art. Article 8 Cases lasting more than 12 months Art. Article 9 Deferrals Art. Article 11 Access to specific case-related data 1. When the reply is negative, it shall be justified.
Where the SC decides to monitor a systemic issue on the basis of sampling of cases which requires additional information or access to OLAF case files, the SC will inform the DG of the criteria for the selection and will request the necessary information or access 2. Article 16 Additional non case-related information The SC can also ask the DG for additional information relating to OLAF's investigation activity which does not constitute a part of a case file.
Article 18 Delegation The DG may delegate in writing the exercise of his functions under these Working Arrangements to one or more members of the staff of the Office. Article 19 Entry into force These Working Arrangements will take effect from the date of their signature. Article 20 Review After one year from the date of the signature of these arrangements, the SC and the DG will evaluate their implementation and may propose, if appropriate, any necessary amendments.
Por correo. Por Fax. Sitio web. Recommendations: —. Conclusion: —. Without establishing an exhaustive list, the SC would point to the following requirements: —. There were five IPPs established in i. For the special policy objectives included: a.
The IPPs have been updated for and they include four criteria: i. There are three prioritised sectors: a. Those general principles include: i. The draft priorities for investigation in include: i. In light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee: 1. The SC's review is based on: a. In particular, OLAF should: a. Increase the number of selectors with investigative experience;. Apply the principle of specialisation of selectors more rigorously;. Adopt proper procedures for dealing with whistle-blowers.
These pre-determined lists could include references to: a. In particular, conclusions of opinions should clearly mention the actions that OLAF intends to take upon completion of the selection process, such as: a. This will entail checking whether: —. Right to private life. Right to express views on all facts.
Activity Report p. Checks of economic operators. Extension of the scope of investigation. Todo ello lo pronuncian nuestros colegas europeos de manera totalmente natural. Desde luego, no podremos soslayar estos temas.
Hablaremos sobre esto con las estadounidenses. Lo que estamos presenciando son unas constataciones muy sencillas, al estilo de la CNN. Una frase que se clava en la conciencia. Vamos a idear una forma para discutir con nuestros colegas estadounidenses. Son nuestros compromisos contractuales. Ya he comentado este tema. Tan pronto los problemas derivados del coronavirus empiecen a menguar, pasaremos a unas negociaciones concretas con nuestros socios.
No hemos sido nosotros quienes se han enfrentado con los problemas de las fechas concretas de convocar esta cumbre. De momento, nadie nos ha informado sobre tales problemas.
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|Investment ab kinnevik b shsd||Prison and penitentiary policy. Creation of two additional offices controlling OLAF but separate from ejemplo ponencia juridica investments Supervisory Committee of OLAF would lead to investment linkedin products hk discuss of independent supervising structures, probably resulting in confusion or conflict of competences and duplication of work. Members ejemplo ponencia juridica investments the SC shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence. The latter initiative was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in June Tema 1 "Acceso a la justicia". The SC is considering other options which would retain the useful instruments proposed by the Commission, but which would at the same time incorporate them into a comprehensive and effective supervision structure. The SC observes that a well-organised and up-to-date ICT support and infrastructure are necessary conditions for a cost-effective fraud investigation function.|
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